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ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the thesis of Ji Bao Yan for the Master of Arts in History 
presented August 22, 1994 
Title: China's Policies Toward The Soviet Union And The United 
States Before And In The Korean War 
In October, 1950, four months after the Korean War broke out, China intervened 
into the conflict. Facing crucial domestic problems, the strategic goals of the Chinese 
Communists in both 1950 and 1951 were basically to strengthen the new regime --- to 
form a solid alliance with the Soviet Union, to capture Taiwan and Tibet, and to 
recover its collapsed economy. The Korean War totally changed the strategic goals of 
the CCP. 
The reason why China entered into the Korean conflict has been a popular topic 
among historians. Some historians held that it was for "China's legitimate interests", 
namely the power supplies on the Yalu border which were vital to Manchurian 
industry. Now it is believed by most historians that the Chinese leadership's decision 
for war was based on its security concerns. To help North Korea was equal to 
defending its own territory. However, the Truman Administration's policy changes 
towards China in the Korean conflict as well as General MacArthur's aggressiveness 
mainly contributed to the formation of their intervention decision. 
Miscalculation of situations on the part of the White House policy makers also 
contributed to the formation of the CCP's intervention decision. They almost 
surpassed the limit of a "limited war" they had designated. 
This thesis deals with China's policy making toward both the Soviet Union and 
the United States in late 1949 and early 1950 and how they made the decision to enter 
the conflict, by making use of recently declassified Chinese sources and available 
American sources. 
I agree with most historians that China made the decision to intervene primarily 
out of security concerns. To be more specific, what the CCP feared was the coming-
back of Chiang Kai-shek and the loss of their regime. This explains why the CCP 
have been declaring that they won a total victory over the United States because they 
saved their communist neighbor from being crashed and they secured their own 
Manchurian border. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In October, 1950, four months after the Korean War broke out, China 
intervened into the conflict. At this time, the People's Republic of China (hereafter 
PRC) was only one year old. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was still facing 
crucial domestic problems of how to feed and clothe its five hundred million people, 
how to consolidate its power, and how to gain as much international recognition as 
possible. The Chinese Communists were also trying to replace Chiang Kai-shek's 
Nationalist Government in the United Nations. With its economy and production 
system in really bad condition, China still aspired to unify its territory by "liberating" 
Taiwan (Formosa) and Tibet. 
In spite of the urgent domestic issues, China confronted the United States in 
Korea. The reason why China intervened into this conflict has been a popular topic 
among historians. Some historians hold that it was for "China's legitimate interests" 
near the frontier1, namely the power supplies on the border which Manchurian 
Industry supplies on the border which Manchurian industry needed. Now it is 
believed by most historians and scholars(Melvin Gurtov, 1980; Hao Yufang & Zhai 
Zhihai; Chen Jian, 1993, etc.) that the Chinese leadership's decision for war was 
primarily based on its security concerns. To help North Korea was equal to defending 
its own territory. 
By making use of recently declassified Chinese sources, the research 
achievements of other historians and available American sources, this thesis aims to 
analyze, from a Chinese perspective, (1 )the domestic situations of China in late 1949 
and early 1950 which confined China to interior goals in early l 950's, (2)the making 
of the Sino-Soviet Alliance which shows China's eagerness to look for protection, 
(3)American policy changes toward Communist China before and during the Korean 
War, namely the dispatch of the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait and continued 
assistance of Chiang Kai-shek as well as the crossing of the 38th parallel, obviously 
off ended the CCP leaders and contributed to the formation of their intervention 
decision, (4)the contacts between the Soviet Union and China, and (5)other factors that 
led to the decision making of the CCP to enter the conflict, so as to clarify more 
specifically the motivation and aim of the Chinese intervention. 
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CHAPTER I 
COMPREHENSIVE CONTEXT BEFORE THE WAR 
The People's Republic of China was formally founded on October 1, 1949. It 
was only about eight months old when the Korean War broke out. China did not get 
directly involved into the conflict until four months later when the North Korea troops 
were desperately driven back out of South Korea by the United Nations forces under 
General Douglas MacArthur. Did China have a positive plan to attack the U.N. forces 
under any circumstances or did it feel compelled to do so? Did China have the 
economic potential and resources for a modem war, which requires the total 
mobilization of civilian production? To address these questions, it is essential to do a 
comprehensive analysis of China's domestic and diplomatic circumstance in late 1949 
and early 1950. 
THE ECONOMY 
The modem history of China was dominated by war. Beginning with the 
overthrow of the last Chinese emperor in 1911, China experienced wars between the 
war lords in the 1910s and 1920s; the Northern Expedition Wars of 1926-1927(or the 
First Chinese Civil War); the War of Land Revolution of 1927-1937(or the Second 
Chinese Civil War); and the War of Resistance Against Japan of 1937-1949. These 
wars totally destroyed the economy of China. After years of carnage, by the end of 
1948, Chiang K~i-shek's Kuomintang regime was financially bankrupt. For instance, 
from June, 1937 to May, 1949, the amount of money in circulation grew 176.8 billion 
times, and prices rose 250 billion times. The inflation upset the market and gave rise 
to wild speculation. As a result, the common working people at the payroll suffered 
and few small or medium business could carry on2. 
In the summer of 1948, Chiang Kai-shek, under the pressure of both financial 
problems and unfavorable war efforts against the communists, sent his son, Chiang 
Ching-kuo to Shanghai to take charge of the Monetary Reform Movement. Chiang 
Kai-shek gambled on this so-called monetary reform for the recovery of his economy 
and the seizure of as much gold as possible. In this reform, the Gold Yuan money 
system was introduced as the sole, legal unit and currency of China, valued at U.S. 
$0.25. It was to be exchanged with the Fabi(the old Chinese currency) at the rate of 1 
: 3,000,000. The currency reform finally turned out to be a currency substitution. The 
common people had no other alternative but to tum in their gold, silver and foreign 
banknotes for the Gold Yuan notes. The majority of the people were financially 
ruined during this currency reform campaign. By the end of 1948, the Gold Yuan 
money became practically worthless. The hyperinflation continued at a faster speed 
but Chiang Chin-kuo was able to collect about 1.3 million ounces of gold, 34 million 
U.S. dollars and large amount of other foreign currencies and silver for the Nationalist 
Government. These gold and foreign currencies were shipped to Taiwan(Formosa) 
immediately. 3 Consequently, both the state industry and private business were hurt 
seriously.4 Another factor which hurt China's industry was that at the end of the 
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Second World War, the Soviet Union occupied Manchuria briefly and sent back to 
Russia over half the remaining capital stock there. Statistics shows the industrial base 
in Manchuria was looted by the Soviet occupation troops of more than two billion 
dollars worth of machinery and equipment. 5 
According to CIA reports, in 1949, industry in China only accounted for about 
10% of the gross national output. Production had dropped by 30% in light industry 
and 70 % in heavy industry.6 Other estimates show that China's industrial production 
reached its lowest ebb in 1949. Food production was about 25% below the pre-1949 
peak. Consumer goods production was also badly influenced. 
When the Chinese Communists took power in October, 1949, they found that the 
economy left behind by the Kuomintang regime was in "an awful mess" 7and their first 
and foremost task was the feeding and clothing of its millions of people. China's 
industry was still very backward not only in comparison with Europe and the United 
States, but also with its close neighbors such as Japan and India. For Instance, the 
consumption of steel per head in 1950 was (in metric pounds): China, 2; India, 11; and 
Japan, 111. The output of electricity of China in 1950 was 2,250 million KWH while 
that of India and Pakistan was 5,63 million KWH and that of Japan was 38,840 
million KWH. At the beginning of 1951, the number of spindles in China was only 4 
million while there were 10.8 million in India. 8 
In agriculture, the economic situation was equally frustrating. Major crops 
production in 1949 fell far below the pre-1949 peaks. It was 113,200,000 tons, 25% 
less; the cotton output was 445,000 tons, 48% less; the output of peanuts was 60% 
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less while draft animals decreased by 16% and farm implements dropped by 30%. 
Fertilizers were seldom used on the Chinese farms. 9 
In 1949, four fifths of the Chinese population were peasants. The density of 
population, measured by the number of people per unit of cultivated land, was 
extremely high. The proportion of population engaged in agriculture in China was 
much larger than in the advanced countries in the West. There was also mass 
underemployment in the countryside. 
In addition to the above problems, there was very little agricultural machinery. In 
1951, China had less than 2,000 tractors while the world total amounted to 6, 130,000. 
In China there were some bare 120,000 acres of arable land per tractor, while it was 
20,398 in India. The Chinese peasants had to depend on animals like oxen, horses and 
donkeys for heavy labor. However, not every farm had animal labor available. 
Statistics show that less than 50% of all farms had animals for heavy labor. 10 Flood 
and drought also hurt China's economy in 1949 and 1950. There were eight million 
hectares of farmland inundated by the flood which displaced forty million people. 
About seven million people were in urgent need of relief. In the cities, about four 
million workers, handicraftsmen and petite intellectuals were out of job. Many others 
were only partially employed. 11 
In 1949 and 1950, the transportation system was disorganized to the point of 
chaos due to decades of international conflicts and civil wars as well as years of 
neglect. There were about 13,500 miles of railway track, of which less than half was 
in operation and much of the remainder was in various states of disorganization and 
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disrepair. On the other hand, the old railway system before 1949 was mostly designed 
at the tum of the century by western financial interests and it was little concerned with 
China's domestic developmental needs. As a result, the system lacked important 
north-and-south linkages and connections which naturally hampered economic 
development. 12 By that time there were under 50,000 miles of main highway in China, 
of which a little bit more than one third was open to traffic and much of the remainder 
in an inadequately maintained state. 13 China had been greatly dependent on inland 
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waterway transportation. But most of the waterway that was open to transportation 
went from the west to the east except the Grand Canal which starts from Hangzhou 
and ends at Beijing. Both the Northwest and southwest areas were rich in water 
resources but were poor in waterway transportation --- commercial transportation could 
only rely on the underdeveloped railway system and manpower. 14 
By 1949, foreign trade had fallen very rapidly as the civil war and hyperinflation 
disrupted the normal channels of communication and trade. Although it recovered 
fairly quickly, it was still only 1,210 million U.S. dollars. More than one third of this 
amount was between China and the Communist bloc countries. 15 
Up to 1950, the rich natural resources of China had not been sufficiently 
explored. For instance, China was one of the richest countries in coal. Its total 
known coal reserves were ample to meet the needs of its developing industry. China 
also possessed the largest known deposits of iron-ore in the world and non-ferrous 
metals and other minerals such as tungsten, antimony and bauxite. Yet only a small 
portion of the rich resources were exploited. 16 
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This backwardness in economy considerably handicapped the people's Liberation 
Army's strength. In early 1950, the army of China was one of the most poorly 
equipped in the world. According to unofficial statistics, a corps in the People's 
Liberation Army was equipped with about 190 70-mm or larger big guns, a limited 
number of Soviet T-33 and T-34 tanks with no air cover at all, while in one U.S. 
division there were over 300 70-mm or larger big guns, about 140 tanks and most of 
the units were highly mechanical and mobile with full air cover and navy support. 
Basically, the three million men of the PLA had only light infantry weapons which 
they captured from either the Japanese or Chiang's troops. 17 
The above statistics shows that although the CCP had been able to defeat Chiang 
Kai-shek's troops in the Chinese Civil War and took power in China in a very short 
period, it did not have necessary economic means and military potential in 1950 to 
afford a large-scale war against any world power. 
Therefore it was natural for the CCP leadership to focus their attention on 
domestic issues in late 1949 and early 1950. To improve the nation's economic plight, 
the CCP developed a five-year plan whose goals were: 
... to concentrate the nation's main efforts on the construction of the 156 
projects designed with the help of the Soviet Union and 694 big and medium-
sized industrial projects so as to lay the initial groundwork for socialist 
industrialization; to foster the growth of agricultural producers' cooperatives, 
whose system of ownership is partially collective, and handicraft 
producers' cooperatives so as to lay the initial foundation for the socialist 
transformation of agriculture and handicrafts; and bring capitalist 
industry and commerce basically into the orbit of various forms of state 
capitalism so as lay the groundwork for the socialist transformation of private 
industry and commerce. 18 
The CCP also demobilized part of it gigantic army and used it for production 
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purposes. On December 5, 1949, Mao Zedong issued the order to the Army to 
participate in production. He wrote, 
This production task must be realized because the long years of war unleashed 
by reactionaries at home and abroad against the Chinese people have brought 
serious disaster to the people and serious destruction to our economy. Today, 
we must carry out the revolutionary war to the end, heal the wounds left by the 
prolonged war, and engage in economic, cultural and national defense 
construction work. But state revenue is inadequate and expenditures are very 
great. This is the great difficulty facing us at present. 19 
This order originated from Mao's comprehensive theory for economic 
development, of which the major steps were, to simplify the governmental 
organizations; to demobilize part of the army on condition that it maintained enough 
strength to defend national territory, to liberate Taiwan and Tibet and wipe out the 
KMT remnants; and to practice strict economy and to raise production. In line with 
Mao's theory, the CCP's Ordinance Committee put forward the principle of "Munitions 
production should be combined with civilian needs" as its guideline. 20 However, as 
the first Five-year Economic Plan was not activated until 1952, it did not provide any 
direct help to the Chinese involvement in the Korean conflict. 
THE POLITICAL SITUATION 
China was still politically unstable in early 1950. Many intellectuals had 
doubts about the Communists' ability to run the country. The capitalists were not 
willing to cooperate with the government. Now and then there was organized KMT 
sabotage in the newly "liberated areas" such as Southwest and Northwest areas. 
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Chiang Kai-shek' regime, by holding Taiwan, had been reorganizing its strength and 
looking for chances to weaken the new Communist government on the mainland. Zhu 
De, Commander-in-chief of the PLA, expressed the fear in his statement at a meeting: 
"The remnants of the Kuomintang gang is now using Taiwan as its base to carry on all 
kinds of intrigues and plots against the Chinese people. American imperialism 
continues to help the KMT with arms. The KMT gangsters are using war vessels 
supplied by America to blockade the China coast; using U.S. aeroplanes to bomb 
Chinese cities and using American and Japanese military personnel sent by the 
American occupationists [in Taiwan] to take part in bombing and other military 
actions. "21 
It was obvious that Zhu De, basing his charges on false and limited information, 
exaggerated the danger of American threat and involvement in Chinese affairs. 
However, his statement was representative of the concern shared by the CCP leaders. 
Besides, the CCP leaders used this in their propaganda campaign to stir up anti-
American sentiment as the foundation of their "lean-to-one-side theory". 
In order to secure its control of China, the CCP decided to implement radical 
measures, including land reforms, industrial transformation from private ownership to 
state capitalist ownership, political campaigns(political purges) to suppress its political 
opponents,, the Five-year Economic Plan and the preparation to annex Tibet and 
capture Taiwan. Mao Zedong was determined and aggressive towards the 
"reactionaries" as he declared: "All the experiences the Chinese people have 
accumulated through several decades teaches us to enforce the people's democratic 
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dictatorship, that is, to deprive the reactionaries of the right to speak and let the people 
alone have the right. "22 Using Mao's theory as the guideline, the CCP launched 
several political movements nationwide, namely, the Land Reform Movement, the San-
fan Movement(The Movement Against Three Evils 1951-1952), the Wu-fan 
Movement(The Movement Against Five Evils 1952), and the Movement To Suppress 
Counter-revolutionaries ( 1950-1952). 
By early 1950, the CCP deployed the major forces of the Fourth Field Army 
under Lin Biao along the coast in Fujian province. This move had two purposes: to 
defend that area and to prepare for the capture of Taiwan. In the meantime, the 18th 
Corps of the Second Field Army was stationed in southwest Sichuan province 
bordering Tibet for the preparation of its annexation. The CCP leadership designed the 
two campaigns as the major task of the PLA in 1950 in the belief that its army, 
though poorly equipped, was able to wipe out the KMT remnants. This belief was 
based on the fact that the PLA had wiped out about 8 million KMT troops on 
mainland China during the Three-year Civil War (CCP statistics) and won a complete 
victory at Hanan Island by using only wooden vessels and infantry weapons. To the 
CCP leadership, the Taiwan Campaign and the Tibetan Campaign were the last two 
campaigns in its efforts to unify the whole country.23 
THE FOREIGN POLICY 
The foreign policy of the newly-born People's Republic of China was 
basically built upon two notions: the two-camp(socialist versus capitalist) theory in 
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ideology and a nation's political and diplomatic stand towards Taiwan as a dividing 
line in practice. 
Diplomatically, the CCP firmly took the Lean-To-One-Side policy as the CCP 
regarded China as being a member of the Socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union. 
Actually the Soviet Union was the first nation to declare diplomatic recognition of the 
People's Republic of China. Then other Eastern European countries joined the Soviet 
Union in recognition. In the West, only Great Britain recognized China for 
consideration of its own commercial interests in Asia(India and Hong Kong) while 
other major western nations remained pro-Chiang Kai-shek. This made the CCP 
realize that the chance of their returning to the United Nations was not great. The 
CCP was also worried about threats from neighboring nations and areas like Japan, 
South Korea, and Southeast Asian countries since they were all pro-America. As a 
matter of fact, in Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan there were either 
American troops or military advisors, whose presence in those neighboring areas was 
regarded by the CCP as composing a major threat to China's security. Primarily out of 
consideration of its territorial security, the CCP leadership made the decision to ally 
with the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites. This decision excluded any 
possibility of reconciliation between the United States and Red China. It also 
committed the CCP to help North Korea when necessary. 24 
In this period, out of the same security concern, the CCP's relations with other 
countries largely depended upon those countries' attitudes towards Taiwan. This 
policy found its origin in an old Chinese saying: "My enemy's enemy is my friend; 
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My enemy's friend is my enemy." This theory was best explained by a CCP 
spokesman on April 30, 1949, "Any foreign government which is willing to consider 
establishing a diplomatic relation with our country should cut off its relations with 
KMT remnant power, and also withdraw its armed forces from China. "25 The United 
States and other major Western countries kept diplomatic relations and economic 
cooperation with Chiang Kai-shek, they naturally became the CCP's enemy. Mao 
openly asserted in August, 1949 that "U.S. naval, ground and air forces did participate 
in the war in China."26 For the same reason, Mao later insisted on signing a mutual 
assistance treaty with Stalin to replace the old one between KMT and the Soviet 
Union. 
Mao Zedong and other CCP leaders were also very much concerned about 
American military intervention which did not actually exist at that specific time period. 
How did their perception of this threat evolve? The best answer is perhaps to do with 
Mao's theory of the "intermediate zone' which found its basis in his understanding of 
the Cold War worldwide. 
Mao's argument was that even though the United States and the Soviet Union 
were confronting and competing each other, they were separated and protected by a 
vast zone that consisted of many capitalist, colonial and semi-colonial countries in 
Europe, Asia and Africa. Mao asserted that the capitalist bloc would take other 
socialist countries before they eventually attack the Soviet Union simply because of 
the geographical buffer of this vast zone. 
To the CCP leaders, Mao's intermediate theory made sense. The CCP leadership 
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strongly believed that the United States was leading a conspiracy to encircle China by 
means of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall plan, the recovery and reformation of 
both Germany and Japan, American occupation South Korea, and particularly, 
American military assistance to Jiang Kai-shek's regime on Formosa as well as the 
stationing of American marines along China's coast. 
The CCP's distrust of America's China policy found its roots in the few 
occassions when the CCP had contacts with the Americans. They felt that they were 
cheated and humiliated by the Americans. It was true especially during the three years 
of the Third Chinese Civil War(l946-1949) when the Americans were openly 
mediating between the CCP and Jiang Kai-shek and indirectly assisting the latter(in 
terms of money, munitions and advisors). 
Mao bitterly believed that the Americans were one step short of declaring war 
upon the Chinese Communists. Mao also believed that the fact that the United States 
did not get directly involved in the Chinese Civil War was not because they lacked the 
intention to do so but because the overall situation of the world forbade them from 
doing so. This laid the basis of the CCP's long-term hostility towards the United 
States. However, it did not mean that the CCP was heading toward a large war with 
the United States. 
Generally speaking, rather than preparing for war, China was preoccupied with 
measures to stabilize its economy and strengthen its national defense by allying with 
the Soviet Union and unifying its territory in early 1950 although they were very 
hostile to the United States and had adopted the Lean-To-One-Side policy 
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diplomatically. To involve in a general war was quite out of the agenda of the CCP 
and was something it could hardly afford. China later entered the Korean War when 
the CCP leadership felt its territory was under threat and felt absolutely necessary to 
do so. 
15 
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CHAPTER II 
THE SINO-SOVIET ALLIANCE 
The Sino-Soviet Mutual Assistance and Friendship Pact which was signed in 
February, 1950 was a milestone not only in the relationship between China and the 
Soviet Union, but also in the Cold War. It was actually a military pact which tied 
China with the Soviet Union, marked the beginning of the Cold War in Asia, and 
greatly influenced the strategic order in the Far East during the 1950s and 1960s. 
Why did the CCP decide to ally with the Soviet Union? How did it affect the 
situation in Asia? Was it decisive to the outbreak of the Korean War? This chapter 
seeks to answer questions in terms of the origins of the Sino-Soviet Alliance both 
practically and ideologically as well as its influence upon the Korean conflict. 
Even before it took power nationwide in China, the CCP realized that it must lean 
to one side, to ally with one of the powers in the world for the protection of Chinese 
interests and the leadership in Asian affairs. This theory was based on the Chinese 
Communist leaders' conviction that the majority of western powers were capitalist 
countries and they were doomed to perish while China was a newly-born socialist 
country and there was nothing in common between China and western powers. The 
CCP leadership felt that China should play a special and leading role in Asian affairs. 
But Red China's status rested only on its size, population and geographical position, 
not on its military or economic strength. Like China under Sun Yat-sen and Chiang 
Kai-shek, Mao's China had to ally with a world power to build up its status in Asia. 
Although nationalism has been a driving force behind the CCP actions and policies, 
the ideological convictions of the CCP definitely shaped their view of the world, 
molded their strategy and provided the rationale for the means of their policy. Mao 
once said, "In the end, the socialist system will replace the capitalist system. This is 
an objective law independent of human will. No matter how hard the reactionaries try 
to prevent the advance of the wheel of history, revolution will take place sooner or 
later and will surely triumph. "27 Among the world powers around 1949, the Soviet 
Union was the only appropriate ally. First of all the Soviet Union was a socialist 
country under Stalin's dictatorship while China was going to be a socialist country 
under Mao's dictatorship. Secondly, the Soviet military power was one of the 
strongest in the world. Thirdly, the Soviet Union's geographical position as China's 
close neighbor made it possible to provide instant assistance when necessary. 
Nevertheless, Mao had some problems with Stalin in the 1930s and 1940s 
concerning the Third Communist International. In the Second Chinese Civil 
War(l927-1937), Stalin sent Wang Ming and Po Ku back to China to direct the 
Chinese revolution there. They were resisted by Mao's local Communist principles. 
They were eventually rejected from the CCP leadership as they firmly followed 
Stalin's directions. Mao called them rigid Marxists, blaming them for failing to 
combine the Communist classics with the actual development of communism in China. 
This could be seen especially in the Second Chinese Civil War(l927-1937). Wang 
Ming and other Soviet-oriented CCP leaders insisted on regular military confrontation 
against the regular well-equipped KMT army ---- (To Keep the enemy outside the 
17 
Gate) while Mao suggested irregular mobile guerrilla warfare, laying emphasis on 
wiping out the major forces of the KMT troops. In the Fifth Anti-encirclement 
Campaign the Red Army adopted Wang Ming's strategy. As a result the Red Army 
failed to smash the encirclement and had to move from south China to the north. 
When the major force of the Red Army reached Shanxi, they lost 90 per cent of their 
men and most of their bases in the south. The lesson was serious and paid with blood. 
During the War of Resistance Against Japan Mao cautiously allied his fairly weak 
Red Army first with Chiang Kai-shek, then with the Soviet Union and the United 
States under the name of the United Front Against the Aggressors. This strategy 
proved to be successful in retaining the strength of Mao's forces as well as its 
development. By the end of the War, Mao's forces expanded to about one million in 
manpower plus more than two million militiamen. 
During the Third Chinese Civil War(l 946-1949) Mao's forces fought the war out 
almost single-handed --- Soviet military assistance was very limited ---- they did not 
get any substantial military assistance from the Soviet Union because at the Yalta 
Conference Stalin promised Franklin Roosevelt that he would never aid the CCP in the 
internal conflict of China in exchange for American recognition of Outer Mongolia 
and other concessions in China. The CCP was obviously unhappy about this, which 
resulted in inharmonious relations between Stalin and Mao. Mao complained: "It is 
also entirely possible that he wanted China to remain divided for a long period .... "28 
On the other hand the Soviet leaders generally doubted the CCP's ability to win the 
war against Chiang Kai-shek. Therefore the Soviet Union took a neutral position in 
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the Third Chinese Civil War while Chiang Kai-shek clearly followed a pro-American 
policy.29 
Actually, during the Third Chinese Civil War, there was full Soviet diplomatic 
support for Chiang Kai-shek on the basis of the Nationalist-Soviet Treaty and no 
recognition of Mao. Stalin's personal comments on Mao's Communist movement in 
China were not very positive. Stalin told the U.S. Ambassador in June, 1944: "The 
Chinese Communists are not real Communists. They are margarine Communists". He 
also called them "cabbage" Communists and "radish" Communists.30 Stalin repeatedly 
affirmed to the West that he only recognized Chiang's Nationalist Government. He 
promised in May, 1945 that he would do everything he could to promote unification of 
China under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. At Potsdam, Stalin openly declared 
that "Chiang Kai-shek's Government was the only possible government in China and 
that the Chinese Communists were not real Communists at all. "31 Lacking respect for 
CCP leadership, Stalin repeatedly interfered in their affairs --- he appointed through 
the Third Communist International the leaders of the Chinese Communists Party, 
namely Qu Qiubai, Li Lisan, Wang Ming, Po Ku and Zhang Wentian. Mao Zedong 
was not one of the Stalin's appointees. When Mao seized the power within the CCP, 
Stalin actually knew little about him, which affected the relationship between the two 
parties to a certain extent. 
As a result the military equipment of the PLA in the civil war was actually what 
they could capture from the Japanese and Chiang's troops. The former U.S. 
Ambassador to Chiang's regime J. Leighton Stuart said in October, 1947 that there was 
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"little if any evidence of material assistance from Moscow" to the Chinese 
Communists.32 Actually when the Second World War was over, Stalin was much less 
concerned about the development of the situation in China than about his own safety 
and fear of violating the spheres of influence prescribed at the Yalta Conference. It 
was not until Mao's troops reached the Yangtze River in early 1949 that Stalin sent his 
special envoy Anastas Mikoyan to Mao's headquarters in Sibaipo, Hebei province of 
China, to get in contact with Mao for first-hand information concerning the Chinese 
Revolution. The envoy brought Stalin's advice that CCP had better not cross the 
Yangtze River to avert triggering a direct Soviet-American confrontation. Mao and 
the CCP did not listen to Stalin. Mao told Mikoyan that it was only a matter of time 
for the CCP to win national victory. Mao pointed out that it was necessary for the 
PLA to go across the Yangtze River to wipe out the remnants of the KMT troops so 
as to "carry the revolution through to the end." Zhou Enlai explained to Mikoyan the 
CCP's plans to construct the political system and the economy as well as the 
framework of China's diplomatic relations. Although Mikoyan's visit did not result in 
direct large-scale Soviet assistance to the CCP, its significance was far-reaching as it 
was the first formal contact between the CCP leadership and the Kremlin leaders. 33 
When the CCP won the three decisive battles against the KMT, they immediately went 
across the Yangtze River in April, 1949 and captured Nanking, Chiang's capital. Even 
after the capture of Nanking, the Soviet ambassador to Chiang's regime left with 
Chiang's central government to Canton(Guangzhou). This embarrassed the CCP and 
made it difficult to establish close strategic cooperation between the CCP and the 
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Soviet Union. 34 
However, China and the Soviet Union had one thing in common --- they were 
both Communist countries in essence which eventually led to a close cooperation 
between them later. When the People's Liberation Army was driving Chiang Kai-shek 
out of the mainland to Taiwan, both Stalin and Mao saw the necessity to become allies 
for each other's interests and established more friendly relations. The CCP tried its 
best to embrace the then current Soviet picture of a world sharply divided into only 
two hostile camps ---- the socialist and the capitalist. Liu Shaoqi, the vice CCP 
chairman, wrote, "The world today has been divided into two mutually antagonistic 
camps: on the one hand, the world imperialist camp, composed of American 
imperialists and their accomplices, the reactionaries of all countries of the world; on 
the other hand, the world anti-imperialist camp, composed of the Soviet Union and the 
New Democracies of Eastern Europe, and the nationalist liberation movements in 
China, Southeast Asia and Greece, plus the people's democratic forces of all countries 
of the world. American imperialism has become the bastion of all the reactionary 
forces in the world; while the Soviet Union has become the bastion of all progressive 
forces .... "35 This analysis served as the guideline for the CCP for about 25 years until 
1974 when Deng Xiaoping put forward the Three-World theory at the United Nations. 
In the formation of the alliance between the CCP and the Soviet Union, there 
were two remarkable events. One was the visit of Liu Shaoqi to Moscow; the other 
was the visit by Mao Zedong himself to Moscow. Liu's visit paved the way for the 
normalization while Mao's visit built up the military alliance between the two 
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communist giants and marked the beginning of confrontation between the East and the 
West in East Asia. 
Liu Shaoqi visited Moscow in July, 1949. Liu was authorized to discuss with 
Stalin all the important issues concerning the international situation and Chinese-Soviet 
relations. Mao and other CCP leaders were very much concerned with this visit. He 
issued the famous "Lean-To-One-Side" policy just two days before the delegation 
headed by Liu Shaoqi departed for Moscow. The timing was purposely set. The 
implied message in the issue of the Lean-To-One-Side policy was very clear: China 
would not be another Yugoslavia and it was ready to cooperate with Stalin. 
At a private meeting with the Chinese delegation Stalin apologized for his failure 
to render sufficient support to the CCP in the Third Chinese Civil War: " ... we have 
been in the way of hinderance to you because our knowledge about you is too 
limited. "36 This was really a surprise to Liu and other Chinese present. This apology 
served as a clear sign that Stalin had realized the importance of the CCP in Asian 
affairs and was willing to treat the CCP as equals. Equal treatment was just what Mao 
wanted from the Soviet Union. 
Then Liu discussed with Stalin Soviet support of the newly founded People's 
Republic of China, especially the recognition of the republic which was the major 
issue of the CCP. It was obvious that the Western countries would not recognize 
China soon. On the other hand the recognition by the Soviet and other Communist 
countries in Eastern Europe was vital to the existence of China and it had not been 
guaranteed. Stalin's response was very positive. He promised to support China 
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unconditionally, which greatly encouraged the CCP leadership. It decided to speed up 
the formation of the Chinese central government and try to shorten the major 
difference between the CCP and the Soviet leadership. 
Liu also discussed with Stalin settlement of the border problems concerning China's 
Sinkiang(Xinjiang) Province where the Russians once had a great influence and the 
Soviet Union had never openly given up its claims in the region. Stalin once helped 
to set up communications between the CCP agents working in Sinkiang and the CCP 
headquarters and used the revolutionary forces in Sinkiang supported with his arms to 
check the KMT forces there. 
Lastly Liu and Stalin discussed the issue of responsibilities of both the Soviet 
Union and Red China in Asia and in the world. Stalin expressed his hope that China 
should play a more important role in Asian affairs. That is to say, the Soviet Union 
would pay more attention to the west, especially Europe since Stalin was mostly 
concerned about a possible invasion from Central Europe, while China should take 
care of East Asian affairs as China had a great influence upon colonial and semi-
colonial countries in the East.37 Liu's meeting with Stalin resulted in a consensus that 
the Soviet Union was going to remain the center of world revolution and China was 
going to promote the revolutionary movements in Asia. 38 It is very likely that Liu also 
discussed with Stalin the issue of Korea but so far no direct Chinese sources could 
prove this. Coincidentally, two divisions composed of Korean soldiers of the PLA 
Fourth Field Army --- 164th and 166th divisions --- were sent back to Korea with their 
equipment just around the time of Liu's visit in Moscow. Therefore we have a reason 
23 
to believe that it had something to do with Liu's visit or Liu might have talked with 
Stalin about the unification of Korea. 39 
Then Mao sent directions to Liu for further cooperation with the Soviet Union in 
August. Liu signed an agreement with the Soviet Union for Chines-Soviet cooperation 
in establishing China's air forces. As a result China received a total of 185 planes of 
different types from the Soviet Union by the end of 1949. In September, 1949, 
another Chinese delegation headed by General Zhang Ai-ping visited Moscow and 
made an agreement for Soviet assistance on China's navy. By the end of the year 
there were 90 Soviet Naval experts working with the Chinese navy. Liu's visit to 
Moscow substantially paved the way for the normalization of relations between the 
CCP and the Soviet Union. 40 
The Soviet Union was the first nation in the world to recognize the People's 
Republic of China. It did so on the second day of PRC's founding. The Soviet 
government informed Zhou Enlai that it would establish diplomatic relations with the 
PRC and end all relations with Chiang's regime. Accordingly, the CCP decided to 
establish diplomatic relation with all new communist countries as soon as possible. 
Now the CCP realized that it was the time for Mao to visit Moscow personally for an 
alliance with the Soviet Union and they started to prepare for such a visit immediately. 
Mao's goal for this visit was very clear --- he was trying to sign a mutual 
assistance treaty with Stalin to replace that between Chiang's regime and the Soviet 
Union. The significance of this visit lies in what Mao said at the time: "This would 
place the People's Republic in a favorable position by forcing those capitalist countries 
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to fit themselves to our principles.; Foreign countries would be forced to recognize 
China unconditionally as well as to abolish those old treaties and sign new treaties 
with us; and those capitalist countries would dare not to take rash actions against us. "41 
One remarkable feature of Mao's visit to Moscow was the length of his stay ---
Mao left Beijing on December 6, 1949 for Moscow and stayed there until mid-
February, 1950. More than two months' stay for a head of state on an official visit in 
a foreign country was unusual and quite unprecedented. Besides this was the first visit 
Mao made in his life to a foreign country. The answer to all this can be found in 
Mao's own words when he was answering Stalin's greetings: "For this trip we hope to 
bring about something that not only looks nice but also tastes delicious. "42 This meant 
something substantial: a new alliance between the two communist countries. 
This was also the first time Stalin and Mao met each other. Both were cautious 
and polite. Stalin praised Mao highly: "Great! Great! You have made tremendous 
contributions to the Chinese people. You are their good son. I wish you good 
health. "43 Then Mao frankly told Stalin of the grievances he felt during the early years 
of the Chinese Communist Party. This unusual act surprised every Chinese present 
because nobody knew Mao would put forward such an issue at the first meeting with 
Stalin. Probably Mao wanted to tell Stalin that he was wronged by the pro-Soviet 
Bolsheviks sent to China by Stalin and he was a person who would not have any 
problem with the Soviet Union. Stalin consoled Mao by saying: "Now you are a 
winner, and a winner should not be criticized. "44 Then Stalin expressed his wish to 
develop a new relationship with Red China. 
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Nevertheless, it was not an easy job for Mao to sign a treaty with Stalin. At first 
Stalin hesitated for a while, basically for two reasons: I) Stalin got reports about the 
CCP policies and problems from I.V. Kovalev, the chief Soviet advisor to China. 
Kovalev reported that some former anti-Soviet CCP members headed by Liu Shaoqi 
were then organizing some groundless criticism against a pro-Soviet CCP V.I.P. Gao 
Gang who was a senior Politburo member of the CCP and the chairman of government 
in the Northeast region(Manchuria). This report made Stalin's attitude towards Mao 
dubious; 2) Stalin was concerned over a possible violation of the spheres of influence 
agreed upon at the Yalta conference --- an over-intimate relationship between China 
and the Soviet Union might cause great concern in the United States which could 
make Asia become a hot spot of the Cold War. 45 
Through Wang Jiaxiang, the Chinese Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Mao 
expressed his wish to abolish the old Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945 between Chiang's 
regime and the Soviet Union. Stalin finally agreed to sign a mutual assistance and 
friendship treaty with Mao as he realized it was better to ally with Mao than to 
continue Soviet relations with Chiang. In the meanwhile he was worried that China 
might also follow the road of Yugoslavia and become independent from him. 
The Chinese side put much thought in the drafting of the treaty document in order 
to guarantee protection from the Soviet Union. Mao did not take part in the 
negotiations concerning the treaty. Zhou Enlai as the foreign Minister talked with 
Andrei Vyshinsky, the Soviet Foreign Minister, for details of the treaty. The draft of 
the treaty was worked out by the Soviet side. The Chinese side deliberated and 
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revised the draft version of the treaty item by item, sentence by sentence. Zhou was 
extremely serious and cautious in considering every single word. Zhou's idea was that 
"The treaty should be all right not only now but also in the future, and it should be 
able to pass the test of time and examination by posterity. "46 The veteran Chinese 
diplomat Wu Xiuquan who accompanied Mao and Zhou to Moscow recalled that the 
treaty was condensed into a text of under 1,000 words but every word had been 
repeatedly considered. For example, one of the clauses read: "In the event that one of 
the contracting parties was invaded by a third state, the other contracting party shall 
render assistance. "47 Zhou felt this was not firm enough and that it did not truly 
reflect the effectiveness of the treaty. Zhou added after "shall render assistance" the 
phrase "by all the means at its disposal." The whole sentence would read as "In the 
event of one of the High Contracting Parties being attacked by Japan or states allied 
with it, and thus being involved in a state of war, the other High Contracting Party 
will immediately render military and other assistance with all the means at its 
disposal. "48 This sounds more affirmative and clear-cut. Because of Stalin's concern, 
this phrase was later discussed and disputed for quite some time but it was finally 
accepted by the Soviet side. 
It was not until February 14, 1950 that the "Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and 
Mutual Assistance Between the PRC and the Soviet Union" was finally signed, which 
was accompanied by a grand signing ceremony in the Kremlin. The meaning of this 
treaty lay in the speech Zhou Enlai made at the celebration ceremony: "The 
significance of the treaty and agreements between China and the Soviet Union is of 
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particular importance for the revived People's Republic of China. This treaty and 
these agreements will help the Chinese people to realize that they are not alone, and 
will help in the restoration and development of Chinese economy."49 But the speech 
made by A.Y. Vyshinsky was quite different as it laid emphasis on friendship and 
mutual interests instead of the alliance: "The Treaty .... expresses the striving of both 
our peoples for eternal friendship and co-operation for the good of our countries, for 
the strengthening of peace and the security of the nations. "50 This difference shows 
that the Soviet Union and China were not totally agreed on some issues ---- The 
Soviet side was not happy about the way the CCP treated Gao Gang, a pro-Soviet 
CCP leader; Stalin and Mao had different ideas about the way to sign the treaty (Stalin 
thought it better to be signed by himself and Mao while Mao insisted that it had better 
be signed by the premiers of both countries since this was something between the two 
states and would sound more formal); and the Soviet Union was hesitant to make a 
clear military commitment to China(in the form of a military alliance which might 
touch the nerves of the West as Stalin worried). 51 In 1962, Mao recalled the problems 
concerning the signing of the Treaty as he noted:" ... Later when I went to Moscow to 
sign the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance, we had to go through 
another struggle. He was not willing to sign a treaty. After two months of 
negotiations he at last signed. When did Stalin begin to have confidence in us? It 
was at the time of the Resist America, Aid Korea Campaign, from the winter of 1950. 
He then came to believe that we were not Tito, not Yugoslavia. "52 
At the same time the Agreement on Chinese Changchun Railway, Lushun(Port 
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Arthur) and Dalian(Dairen) Between China and the Soviet Union was signed as the 
Changchun Railway had been an issue that caused troubles between China and the 
Soviet Union. Three days later on February 17, 1950, Mao and Zhou Enlai went back 
to China, the goal of reasonably guaranteed protection from the Soviet Union having 
been achieved. 
To China the Treaty was more symbolic than substantial in terms of economic 
assistance from the Soviet Union --- the Soviet Government agreed to grant long-term 
credits amounting to 300,000,000 American dollars at one per cent interest over a 
period of five years for the purchase of industrial equipment from the Soviet Union 
unlike Soviet aid to East European countries which did not charge any interest. This 
amount was far less than what China needed for the recovery of its economy. China 
probably could have gotten more credits from the Western countries if it had realized 
normal relations with the western countries. 53 
In commenting on the Sino-Soviet Treaty, historian Wang Gungwu thought that 
the Chinese decision to side with the U.S.S.R. was "fateful" as "it had serious 
repercussions for the P.R.C. in the United Nations, in the U.S. intervention in Korea 
and the Taiwan Straits, and in the Cold War ... But it also had a positive impact on 
China's internal development.... What was crucial, however, was the confidence that 
the Soviet backing gave to China's sense of security and sovereignty and the way this 
enabled the Chinese to concentrate on the immense task of national reconstruction. "54 
Another feature of Mao's visit in Moscow was its impact upon the coming Korean 
conflict. The fact was that Kim II Sung, the North Korean leader also visited Moscow 
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around the time of Mao's visit. It was not a coincidence. Kim 11 Sung deliberately 
planned this visit. 55 With very clear purposes, he was seeking military assistance by 
every effort from both the Soviet Union and China for launching a war upon South 
Korea while Mao was staying in Moscow. Kim 11 Sung optimistically thought that the 
time was ripe for North Korea to "liberate" the south because in South Korea there 
were rich resources of rice plantation lands, fine weather for crops, advanced fishery 
which could provide the north with food for its people and the north could provide the 
south with raw materials for its industry; the North Korean Communist Party 
organizations were all over the South and did much political propaganda work. So 
long as the Central Committee gave the order, the people in the South would rise in 
arms to overthrow the South Korean Government; and the North Korean army was 
superior to the South Korean army. If they were going to launch a surprise attack, 
Kim was sure that he could win the war. 56 
Stalin had some concern that the United States might interfere. This was the 
reason why Stalin withdrew the Soviet military advisors from North Korea when the 
United States strongly criticized the North Korean aggression. Stalin's idea was "If we 
leave our advisors there, they might be captured which would be used by the United 
States as an excuse to interfere. This was something Kim 11 Sung has got to take care 
of by himself. "57 
On the other hand, Mao's response was definite. He agreed to Kim's proposal to 
launch the attack upon the South, believing that the United States would not interfere 
as this war was going to be only an internal affair among the Koreans themselves ----
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other nations had no right to interfere. Mao also promised to send in his ground 
forces only when necessary. At the same time Stalin agreed to provide air cover for 
the Chinese ground forces. 58 
Mao's optimistic opinion about the Korean situation seemed to be contradictory 
to his hesitation later on when the CCP was going to intervene in the Korean conflict. 
Obviously what Mao said in Moscow was based on his miscalculation of the situation 
as he had not expected the United States to react so promptly. Both Mao and Kim 11 
Sung figured that North Korea could easily unify the Korean peninsula before the 
United States and other Western countries could do anything. On the other hand, Mao 
did not expect that China had to enter the war directly. He was speaking more from 
the angle of an onlooker, which led him to dwell on communist internationalism, than 
a direct participant of the conflict. 
The former Soviet Chairman, Nikita Khrushchev, recalled that he had the same 
idea as Mao that this was a national liberation war instead of a war of one nation 
against another. Khrushchev admitted that by the time when the three Communist 
leaders met in Moscow the Soviet Union had already provided much arms to North 
Korea, including tanks, big guns, rifles and munitions.59 
In January, 1950, Mao also promised to send back to Korea more Korean soldiers 
serving in the PLA with their weapons and equipment as a substantial support for the 
coming Korean Conflict. By the fall of 1950, more than 100,000 North Koreans were 
returned to North Korea. 60 
It is possible that the Soviet Union , China and North Korea formed a sort of 
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Communist triangle alliance in early 1950 and reached agreement on the issue of 
sponsoring a North Korean attack upon the South. Nevertheless, it does not mean that 
China would play an active role or be directly involved at the very start of the Korean 
War as it did not have the necessary military potential and economic resources to do 
so. On the other hand China was preoccupied with its domestic affairs in late 1949 
and early 1950, such as the capture of Taiwan, the annexation of Tibet and the 
recovery of its economy. China later entered the Korean Conflict basically out of its 
own security concern, that is, the protection of its own interests and its power. 
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CHAPTER III 
MAJOR CHANGES IN U.S. FAR EAST POLICY 
AND ITS IMPACT UPON THE KOREAN WAR 
When the Second World War was over, both the communist leaders and western 
leaders began to realize that the major confrontation in this world was going to be that 
between the East and the West. While the Soviet Union was tightening its control 
over East European countries, the western powers became alert about the ambitious 
expansion of the Soviet Union. 
In January, 1946, the United States Joint War Plans Committee projected that 
instead of seeking buffer zones along its borders, the Soviet Union aimed to dominate 
the "Eurasian landmass"and all of its approaches. This implied that the Soviet Union 
wanted nothing less than world domination and the destruction of capitalism. In 
February, the War Department advised President Truman that the United States should 
not compromise on principle and should provide bilateral support to nations threatened 
by Soviet expansion. In order to meet the perceived threat the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
desired a policy with global responsibility.61 
On March 5, 1946 Sir Winston Churchill made his famous Fulton speech in Harry 
Truman's home state, Missouri. His message was clear that the untrustworthy Soviet 
Union was not going to be civilized and he called upon "the fraternal association of 
English-speaking peoples"62 to prevent war and further Soviet expansion. Churchill's 
remark impressed most Americans that it was time to stop communist expansion. In 
February, 1947, while trying to solve the problems in Turkey and Greece, Truman 
made a statement of policy known as the Truman Doctiine: that the United States 
should support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation. The president 
then requested $400 million in economic and military assistance. His new policy won 
majorities in both houses. It meant clearly that Russia must be stopped, contained 
within her own territory; the United States at last had believed that the Soviet Union 
was bent on world revolution which was going to be a greater menace to freedom than 
Nazi Germany. The Cold War was triggered. 
In the following two years, the United States and the West underwent tests on 
issues of the Marshall Plan for the recovery of Europe, Point four Program, the Berlin 
blockade, Rival Governments in Germany, NATO and Warsaw Pact and the rise of 
Red China. Those issues contributed to the elevation of confrontation between the 
East and the West. 
Between late 1949 and early 1950, U.S. policy in the Far East changed 
considerably. These changes not only had a great influence on later Sino-American 
relations, but also directly had some impact upon the coming conflict in Korea. 
On July 1, 1949, when the Chinese Nationalist Government asked the United 
States for help again, Dean Acheson responded that "the United States stands ready to 
help, but first China would have to give evidence of ability to help herself. "63 This 
was a signal that the United States would soon abandon the thought of involvement in 
China since it had been so costly. On the other hand, Acheson still hoped that "the 
United States might have the capability to prevent the further expansion of 
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Communism on the Asian continent and into Southeast Asia. "64 
On August 5, 1949, the State Department published the C/una Wlute Paper. This 
document served mainly as a summary of United States' China policy since the end of 
the Second world War. It also aimed to shift America's responsibility for losing the 
war (the Third Chinese Civil War between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung's 
Communists, 1946-1949), trying to place all the blame upon the Chinese Nationalist 
Government itself -- the United States policy had been in no way responsible for the 
"ominous result". It implied that the support of the Nationalist Government and the 
efforts of the United States toward survival of the government were at an end. 65 
The CCP did not give any credit to the United States for its attempt to abandon 
Chiang Kai-shek. Following the release of the C/una Wlute Paper, Mao Zedong 
published two important articles, Cast Away Illusions, Prepare for Struggle, and 
Farewell, Leigliton Stuart. Mao stated that the C/una W/ute Paper "reflects the victory 
of the Chinese people and the defeat of imperialism. "66 While regarding this as a good 
opportunity to speed up their conquest of the whole country, Mao warned his party 
members not to forget the possibility of U.S. direct military intervention and "Prepare 
for struggle".67 Mao's argument was that the United States would sooner or later come 
back, his theory being that "by seizing China, the United States would possess all of 
Asia."68 
Both Harry Truman and Dean Acheson, seeing that there was nothing they could 
do to prevent the collapse of the Chiang kai-shek regime, made the decision to cease 
financial assistance to Chiang. Actually, Chiang's regime was too inefficient and too 
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corrupt, which certainly led Truman to declare that "We are not going to give the 
Chinese a nickel for any purpose whatever" because "all the money we have given 
them is now invested in United States real estate. "69 Besides, the President had 
realized that "Peace in the world would not be achieved by fighting more wars" and 
that "there were two enormous land masses that no western army of modern times had 
ever been able to conquer: Russia and China. It would have been folly, and it would 
be folly today, to attempt to impose our way of life on these huge areas by force." 70 
When Chiang's regime was retreating from mainland China to Taiwan(Formosa), 
the attitude of the State Department was resolute: "Any overt military commitment in 
Formosa would be unwise at this time as the establishment of U.S. military forces on 
Formosa in the present situation would be not only diplomatically disadvantageous but 
also, and far more important, a heavy political liability for us. "71 Political and 
economic measures were suggested to help stop the advance of communism toward 
Taiwan and southeast Asia. It was also suggested that units of the United States Navy 
had better not be stationed at or off Formosan ports in support of the political and 
economic measures because if the United States was going too far in the involvement 
of the case of Formosa, it would be utilized by the Communists to arouse anti-U.S. 
sentiment. 72 
Due to the inefficiency of the Chiang Kai-shek's government and the non-
assistance policy of the United States, the People's Liberation Army(PLA) under the 
Chinese Communists was able to capture the mainland of China in a short period. 
Based on the above-mentioned issues, the White House set up its global defense 
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strategy --- Global communist expansion must be deterred with the major theater in 
Europe; China was gone due to the inefficiency of Chiang's corrupted government --
better leave the door open for possible entente with the new regime in the future. 
These two principles can be seen in coming measures taken by the Truman 
Administration. 
First, President Harry Truman declared on January 5, 1950 that "the United States 
had always stood for good faith in international relations. Traditional United States 
policy toward China, as exemplified in the Open-door policy, called for international 
respect for the territorial integrity of China ... The United States has no predatory 
designs on Formosa or on any other Chinese territory. The United States had no 
desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa at 
this time. Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in 
the present situation. The United States Government will not pursue a course which 
will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China. "73 The ambiguous language of 
this statement could be interpreted in various ways. A possible communist 
understanding of this could be that the United States would not interfere or render any 
further military assistance to Chiang Kai-shek if the PLA was going to capture 
Formosa and other places remaining under Chiang's control although the real intention 
of the United States was to "develop and support a local non-communist Chinese 
regime which will provide at least a modicum of decent government for the islands. "74 
In addition to the President's statement, Dean Acheson stated at the 35th Meeting 
of the National Security Council on the Formosa problem, "We must carefully conceal 
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our wish to separate the island from mainland control." Then he acknowledged that 
"our feeling is that, given the tactics employed by the Communists in seizing power, 
the use of our military power, short of complete blockade and occupation, will be 
inefficient to prevent Communist control of Formosa" and that "We are under no 
illusions that we can through present diplomatic and economic measures guarantee a 
denial of Formosa to the Communists." 75 
The president and the secretary of state looked at this matter from a practical 
viewpoint: "We maintain diplomatic relations with other countries primarily because 
we are all on the same planet and must do business with each other. "76 But this was 
far from an intention to develop official diplomatic relations with Communist China 
soon. 
In the Memorandum by Gerald Stryler of the office of Chinese Affairs, it was 
suggested that "Nothing is to be lost by recognition, nothing to be gained by non-
recognition; non-recognition would hamper trade or make trade impossible; Chinese 
public opinion will be more favorable to the U.S. if the U.S. recognizes; recognition 
might make possible reestablishment of the tradition U.S. policy of the Open Door; 
and only by recognition can relations with the Chinese be 'normalized."'77 Stryler 
further suggested that the United States should begin at once to disentangle itself from 
the Nationalist Government. 78 
In his personal letter to the president, Dean Acheson explained the United States 
interests in China and the importance to maintain relations with Mainland China by 
dating back to the "religious, philanthropic and cultural ties which have united the two 
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peoples" and "the use of the Boxers' indemnity for the education of Chinese students, 
the abolition of extraterritoriality during the Second World War and U.S. extensive aid 
to China during and since the close of the war. "79 Acheson seemed to be in favor of 
setting up normal relations with mainland China. 
Soon, the Truman Administration made another dramatic move in its Far East 
policy, which had some effect on later events in the Far East. On January 12, 1950, 
Dean Acheson presented a statement of policy before the National Press Club for the 
purpose of discussion of American policies in the Far East. In commenting on the 
viewpoint that the real interest of the United States was to stop the spread of 
communism, Acheson described it as "put the cart before the horse" as he said that "of 
course we are interested in stopping the spread of communism. But we are interested 
for a far deeper reason than any conflict between the Soviet Union and the United 
States."80 
Based on the same ground, the outline of Dean Acheson's national security 
perimeter of the United States was presented in the following way: "This defensive 
perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then to the Philippines Islands. "81 The 
significance of this perimeter statement was far-reaching -- It implied that Korea and 
Formosa were both excluded from this defense perimeter or even that the United 
States would not bother to interfere if the Chinese Communists should take action to 
capture Formosa. At least the Chinese Communists interpreted it this way. For this 
statement Dean Acheson was frequently accused of giving "green light" for the North 
Korean aggression. It seems to most historians that Dean Acheson's speech "was a 
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classic failure of deterrence".82 At least he was "irrational" as Bruce Cumings looked 
at it. 83 No matter what Acheson's real purpose was in this statement, some observers 
were puzzled by it since "Mao Zedong's impending victory in China would leave the 
Republic of Korea as the only remaining foothold of democracy in Northeast Asia. "84 
The reason why Dean Acheson made this controversial statement was probably 
based upon two facts: 1. By that time both the Soviet Union and the United States 
had withdrawn all their troops from Korea -- if the United States put Korea within its 
National Defense perimeter, it would be unacceptable to the Soviet Union; 2. The fall 
of Chiang's regime was only a matter of time -- any further military involvement with 
the KMT government would hurt the chances of detente between Red China and the 
United States. Later Dean Acheson apologized for this much criticized speech: "in 
those days I was fresh and eager and inexperienced. You've left yourself open to a 
very serious misunderstanding." 85 Richard Nixon simply called it "a miscalculation".86 
The Truman Administration was already inclined to abandon Chiang Kai-shek but 
it was out of the question to recognize mainland China. The anti-Western attitude of 
the Chinese Communists and its totalitarian Communist conviction were totally 
unacceptable to the White House policy makers. The Truman Administration did not 
have any intention to recognize China in late 1949 and in 1950 in spite of advice for 
recognition from some China experts. 
Regardless of the real motives behind the Truman Administration's defense 
perimeter statement -- whether they had the idea that Mao might develop into another 
Tito or that the Chinese Communists' interests must conflict with those of the Soviet 
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Union or the Soviet Union could not influence China's future destiny, the Chinese 
Communists were very sensitive of the perimeter speech's significance. The CCP 
regarded it as a kind of signal or promise that the United States would let Formosa 
and Korea fall. The CCP lost no time in setting its military goals in 1950 accordingly. 
The Third Field Army was ordered to station in East China(near Nanjing, Hangzhou 
and Shanghai) to defend that area and build up a base for the campaign to capture 
Taiwan; The Second Field Army would follow the Third Field Army to occupy 
Southeast China and to liberate Sichuan, Guizhou and Yunnan; The Fourth Field 
Army( with the 4th Corps of the Second Field Army) would go to wipe out the KMT 
remnants in the Central south of China and be deployed in that region; The First Field 
Army was supposed to complete the liberation of the Northwest region; and the 2nd 
Corps of the First Field Army was deployed near Chinhuangdao and Tanggu 
area( close to Tianjin) to prevent any hostile landing. By June, 1950, the PLA had 
wiped out most KMT remnants on the mainland and unified the whole territory except 
Taiwan and Tibet. 87 Although the CCP planned to capture Taiwan and annex Tibet as 
soon as possible, Mao and other Chinese leaders realized it needed much preparation 
since China did not have enough air force or navy(the building up of both just got 
started) to support its ground forces. At a meeting, Mao pointed out that the liberation 
of both Taiwan and Tibet was "still a task of serious struggle."88 His point was based 
on the fact that in September, 1949, the PLA had suffered a serious frustration in the 
Jinmen Campaign in which most of the PLA landing troops (about 10,000 soldiers) 
were wiped out by the KMT garrison troops as the PLA did not have enough air and 
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naval support. 
On May 17, 1950, the PLA took Hainan Island, then it took Zhoushan Islands 
which served as a defensive screen for Formosa. The Formosan Intelligence 
Department reported a large number of Third Field Army troops concentrated in Fujian 
province; naval vessels anchored in the ports of the Taiwan Strait; and air planes 
stationed in the airfields close to the Taiwan Strait. 89 At this moment most people on 
Formosa believed that Chiang's regime could hardly survive one more year -- it was 
but a matter of time and then Formosa would fall. 
The sudden outbreak of the Korean War totally changed the destiny of Formosa. 
It was the Korean war that saved Chiang's regime as the Truman Administration 
hastily adjusted their Far East policy and their non-assistance policy on Formosa. 
On June 25, 1950, when the War suddenly broke out in Korea, both Truman and 
Acheson were shocked. Their first response was that this was part of the global 
Communist aggression against the free countries and it must be initiated and sponsored 
by the Soviet Union. President Truman believed that this crisis was not a civil war 
precipitated by North Korea. He stated: "The attack upon Korea makes it plain 
beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer 
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was quite convincing to some observers since by that time "the People's Republic of 
China, along with the Soviet Union, espoused a doctrinaire of two-camp international 
outlook, and took an ideologically inspired, revolutionary strong stand against the 
United States and Japan. "91 The President felt an urgent need to counter-attack this 
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Communist aggression, believing that "the Russians are trying to get Korea by default, 
gambling that we would offer no resistance. I thought that we are still holding the 
stronger hand, although how much stronger, it is hard to tell. "92 
The White House reacted promtly. In line with the U.N. Security Council 
resolution passed on June 25, the President issued the first order: 
1. General Macarthur be authorized to furnish the Republic of Korea with military 
equipment in excess of that already authorized under the Mutual Defense 
Assistance Program. 
2. that American airplanes be employed to cover the evacuation of American 
women and children from the port of Inchon near Seoul. 
3. that the Air Force be authorized to destroy North Korean tanks and airplanes 
that attempted to interfere with the evacuation .... 
5. that the Seventh Fleet be ordered to prevent a Chinese Communist invasion of 
Taiwan as well as a Nationalist assault on the Chinese mainland.93 
The President's purpose was very explicit -- he intended to restore peace and 
order in South Korea by fighting a limited war. While holding the Europe-first theory, 
the President was clear that " .... this is one of the places where the Soviet-controlled 
Communist world might choose to attack" and that "if the Communists were permitted 
to force their way into the Republic of Korea without opposition from the free world, 
no small nation would have the courage to resist threats and aggressions by stronger 
Communist neighbors. If this was allowed to go unchallenged it would mean a third 
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world war, just as similar incidents had brought on the second world war. "94 
Strategically, the dispatch of the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait was 
intended as a deterrence to the seeming Domino Effect in East Asia as the President 
explained himself. Politically, it served as a warning to the Chinese Communists not to 
take any bold action upon Taiwan as he explained that the seventh Fleet was to 
"prevent the [Korean] conflict from spreading to that area"95 and that "the 
determination of Formosa(Taiwan)'s future status must await the restoration of security 
in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United 
Nations."96 Nevertheless, Truman did not expect that the neutralization of the Taiwan 
Strait was one of the factors that contributed to China's determination to enter the 
Korean Conflict. It not only outraged Beijing, but also made it possible for China to 
transfer its elite army units from Fujian province into Manchuria. Secondly, the 
President related the Korean incident to the issue of Taiwan, which naturally enlarged 
a local conflict into an international crisis. To the Chinese Communists, the issue of 
Taiwan was an entirely interior affair of China: other countries did not have the right 
to interfere into this matter. They also believed that they were justified to unify any 
part of its territory, including Taiwan. 
The CCP was especially angry about the sending of the Seventh Fleet into the 
Taiwan Strait as it firmly believed this was part of the American conspiracy to 
interfere in China's internal affairs. Open protests were made by Mao Zedong, Zhou 
Enlai and commentators of Renmin ribao(People's daily) and Guangming ribao(the 
CCP organization newspaper). All regarded the American action as "imperialist 
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behavior" and "Aggression". Zhou Enlai stated: " .... I declare that Truman's statement 
of June 27, and the action of the American Navy, constitute aggression against the 
territory of China, and a total violation of the United Nations' Charter. This violent, 
predatory action by the U.S. government comes as no surprise to the Chinese people, 
but only increases their wrath because the Chinese have, over a long period, constantly 
exposed all the conspiratorial schemes of the American imperialists for aggression 
against China and grabbing Asia by force. "97 Zhou Obviously exaggerated the degree 
of American involvement in his speech. However, it expressed the resolute 
determination of the CCP to claim Taiwan as part of its territory: "No matter what 
obstructive action the U.S. imperialists may take, the fact that Taiwan is part of China 
will remain unchanged forever. All the people of our country will certainly fight to 
the end single-minded to liberate Taiwan from the grasp of the American aggressors."98 
Mao Zedong bitterly criticized the change of U.S. policy on Taiwan. He insisted 
that "The affairs of Asia should be handled by Asians, and not by Americans. 
American aggression can not but evoke widespread determined resistance on the part 
of Asian people. Although Truman announced last January 5 that the United States 
would not intervene on Taiwan, he himself has just proven the hypocrisy of that 
statement and at the same time has broken every international agreement by the United 
States that it would not interfere in the internal political affairs of China. "99 
The Chinese leaders' false understanding of Truman's decision to send the 
Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait was that the United States Government was 
determined to defend Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek and use Taiwan as a springboard 
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to invade mainland China. It seemed that an enlarged Korean War would offer 
Chiang Kai-shek some hope which was none other than the outbreak of a third world 
war. This suspicion became more convincing to the CCP leadership when Chiang 
Kai-shek offered to send 33,000 of his elite troops to join the fighting in Korea. The 
CCP leadership had a big concern about the possibility that whenever the Korean 
situation turned unfavorable to the North Koreans, the U.N. forces and Chiang's troops 
might invade Manchuria while Chiang's troops could attack the south of China with 
the support of the Seventh Fleet. 100 All this became a warning signal to Beijing that 
"Reactionaries are going to strangle the New China in its cradle." 101 
Based upon the above analysis, the CCP leadership was said to have kept a fairly 
clear mind about the seemingly favorable situation in Korea according to some 
recently declassified Chinese sources and publications. Mao and other Chinese leaders 
had expected a possible tum in Korea because of the large-scale military interference 
of the United States on response to the invasion of South Korea. Under the suggestion 
of Mao Zedong, the CCP held a National Defence Conference on July 7 and 10, 1950 
in Beijing to discuss the situation of the Korean War and the defence of China's 
territory. Zhou Enlai presided over the conference. Most of the CCP Military 
Committee members attended the meeting, such as Zhu De, Nie Rongzhen, Lin Biao, 
Luo Ronghuan, Xiao Hua, and Xiao Jinguang. According to the resolution of this 
Conference, the CCP Military Committee issued an important order -- "Tire Resolution 
to Defend tire Nortlreastem Border" 102 whose principal measure was to form the 
Northeastern Border Army by transferring troops from the Thirteenth Army Corps 
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(under its command there were the 38th Army, 39th Army, 40th Army and the 42th 
Army), and 1st, 2nd and 8th artillery divisions. The Northeastern Border Army 
commanded 250,000 men. Its major tasks were to defend the Manchuria border and to 
join the fighting in Korea if necessary .103 The original commander of the Thirteenth 
Corps was General Huang Yongsheng. Lin Biao, Luo ronghuan and Liu Yalou all 
held the opinion that Huang Yongsheng was incapable carrying out the duties of 
commander-in-chief of the Northeast Border Army and that General Deng Hua was a 
better choice for it. Based upon their advice, the CCP Military Committee authorized 
General Deng Hua to be the Commander of the Thirteenth Corps. The reason for 
using this army Corps was that it once formed an elite unit of the Fourth Field Army, 
whose soldiers mostly came from Manchuria and were familiar with both the climate 
and geography in that area. 104 From this arrangement it is obvious that the CCP's first 
move after the Korean War broke out was defensive. 
Since the CCP took a defensive attitude at the early stage of the War, China 
showed pretty much restraint to the First U.N. Security Council resolution on the 
Korean issue. On July 21, 1950, Zhou Enlai made it clear to K.M. Panikkar (the 
Indian ambassador to China) that the Chinese had every intention of avoiding 
implication in present hostilities unless forced upon them. 105 Later, Zhu De, the 
Commander-in-chief of the PLA, reaffirmed this stand of the Chinese Government. 
He stated: "There is no need to fear outbreak of world war since decision as to 
whether such a war would break out is not in America's hands but in ours" and "China 
would definitely not become involved in world war until fully prepared" and "the 
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Chinese troops would not be sent into Korea although Chinese people are sympathetic 
with the Korean people and would give them other forms of aid." 106 Zhu's speech can 
be interpreted as that China was ready and confident to set back any invasion by the 
United States and that since China was not going to send any of its troops into Korea, 
the chance of a world war was minimal. 
On July 23, 1950, the CCP took another step to strengthen the leadership of the 
Northeastern Border Army and the Thirteenth Army Corps. Mao Zedong issued an 
order authorizing Gao Gang as the Commander-in-chief and political commissar of the 
Northeastern Border Army, Han Xianchu and Hong Xuezhi as deputy commanders of 
the Thirteenth Army Corps. 
The authorization of General Douglas MacArthur to be the Supreme Commander 
of the U.N. forces caused much concern of the Chinese leadership. Indisputably, the 
President was going to take advantage of the General's military merits and his long 
service in Asia. However, Truman neglected one important element of the General --
he was totally Asia-oriented, believing Asia to be the major theater to deter the global 
communist expansion. There was also a basic strategic difference between the 
president and the general -- the president wanted to check the Communist expansion in 
Korea by fighting a limited war while the general aimed to achieve a complete victory 
there. The general stated: "The Communist threat is a global one. Its successful 
advance in one sector threatens the destruction of every other sector. You cannot 
appease or otherwise surrender to Communism in Asia without simultaneously 
undermining our efforts to halt its advance in Europe. "107 He occasionally criticized the 
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White House policy makers because they "don't understand the Oriental Mind" for 
their less aggressive strategy in Asia. 108 He ardently believed that "War's very 
objective is victory -- not prolonged indecision. In war, indeed, there can be no 
substitute for victory." 109 As a professional soldier, MacArthur was expecting a 
complete victory over the communists in Korea which required a much wider war into 
Manchuria -- he did not want to see any type of appeasement there. 
In July and August, one incident made the CCP become more alert about their 
own security. That was the official visit of Douglas MacArthur to Taiwan. The 
Taiwan news media made full use of this occasion to propagandize their "fine" 
relations with the United States. Pictures were taken of the General arm in arm with 
Chiang kai-shek and were carried on the first page of Formosan newspapers. It aimed 
to give the whole world an impression that "the United States was determined to 
defend Taiwan with Chiang. "110 In his memoir, General MacArthur expressed his 
personal feeling on this visit: "It was a great pleasure for me to meet my old comrade-
in-arm of the last war, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. His indomitable determination 
to resist Communist domination aroused my sincere admiration." 111 To the CCP, the 
general's attitude was equal to an open challenge to their preparation of the Taiwan 
Campaign as the general stated: "Arrangements were completed for effective 
coordination between the American forces ... and those of the Chinese Nationalists." 112 
The general strongly believed that this coordination was able "to meet any attack 
which a hostile force might be foolish enough to attempt. Such an attempt would ... 
stand little chance of success." 113 Chiang Kai-shek lost no time to proclaim that 
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"victory is guaranteed by a second-time cooperation with an old friend." 114 
Under such a situation, the CCP's plan to capture Taiwan had to be postponed so 
as to focus on Korea and on the defence of mainland China. Mao told Zhou Enlai 
that it was totally unfavorable to North Korea to have a stalemate with the U.N. forces 
as North Korea did not have any air or naval support at all. Mao thought the best 
opportunity for North Korea to win a quick victory was gone. Mao and Zhou shared 
the opinion that the United States would try its best to win the war so as to keep its 
prestige in the W estem World and the war would very likely tum unfavorable to North 
Korea. China should be prepared for the worst. 115 
On August 4, 1950, the CCP Politburo met again to discuss the Korean War 
development. At the meeting Mao expressed his own opinion that "If the U.S. 
imperialists won the war, they would become more arrogant and would threaten us. 
We should not fail to assist the Koreans. We must lend them our hands in the form of 
sending our military volunteers there. The timing could be further decided, but we 
have to prepare for it." 116 Whether those military volunteers were going to be 
composed of the PLA elements or simply of armed civilians, Mao did not say. Ever 
since Mao made this statement, it had been taken as the guideline of the CCP for 
major decisions later. The next day(August 3, 1950), Mao ordered the Northeastern 
Border Defense Army to complete preparations for war operations in early 
September. 117 
August 7, 1950, People's Daily Editorial stated that "We Chinese people would 
like to support, together with all the just governments and just peoples, the proposal 
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made by the Soviet Union to solve the Korean problem peacefully, to free the United 
Nations from the control of the American invaders and restore it back to its role as a 
defender of peace." 118 
On August 10, Warren Austin, the United States delegate to the United Nations 
made a statement at the U.N. Security Council that the American government was 
planning to reunify Korea under U.N. auspices. This was an official signal to Beijing 
that the United States was going to bring its troops to the doorway of Manchuria. 
August 20, Zhou Enlai, as China's foreign minister, telegraphed the U.N. 
security council, officially expressing China's stand to support the Soviet Union's 
proposal to solve the Korean problem peacefully and insisting that China should be 
included in the discussion of the Korean issue; military actions must be stopped at 
once in Korea; and foreign troops must be withdrawn from Korea immediately 
otherwise it was impossible to solve the Korean problem peacefully. 119 The CCP 
hoped this could clarify China's defensive stand and bring the war to a peaceful end. 
August 23, the CCP held another meeting to discuss the updated Korean situation. 
At the meeting some military analysts brought forward the opinion that the United 
States might be planning a landing somewhere along the western Korean coast in the 
rear area of North Korean troops. This opinion was immediately reported to Mao. 
Mao thought it was very likely to happen and instructed the Chinese diplomat in 
Korea to inform the North Korean leaders. Then Mao issued an order, in the name of 
the CCP Military Committee, to the Northeastern Border Army headquarters, asking 
them "to accelerate and complete all the preparations for war before the end of 
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September. "120 
China's concern about its own security was deepened when the United States 
airplanes violated the border between China and North Korea. On August 27 and 29, 
U.S. B-29 bombers entered China's air space near the Yalu River by mistake and 
bombarded some targets which caused damages to railway installations and wounded 
civilians. For the first time since the start of the Korean War, the Chinese 
Government issued strong protests to Dean Acheson and the U.N. Security Council. 
Then there were nationwide anti-American protest demonstrations in China. This 
propaganda movement served as public opinion preparation for possible military 
actions later. A People 's China editorial expressed the CCP's apprehension of 
the possibility that the United States would spread the war to China, relating the fate 
of North Korea with China's own security issue for the first time: 
We must regard the Korean people's defensive war as our war, for the 
American invasion of Korea is as much a threat to us as it is to the existence 
of a free and independent Korean nation. That is why the attack on Korea has 
such sinister undertones for China, why the struggle of the Korean people is 
bound up with our struggle, and inevitably with the struggle of all Asian 
peoples against imperialism. 121 
Historian Chen Jian argues that "Even before the American landing at Inchon, 
CCP leaders were inclined to enter the war." 122 His point is based upon the Memoirs 
by Bo Yibo, a senior member of the CCP, that on August 4, 1950, the CCP Politburo 
met to discuss the Korean situation. At the meeting Mao expressed his opinion that 
China should help North Korea "in the form of sending our military volunteers 
there" .123 Actually this was only Mao's personal opinion -- it was far from a final 
decision of the CCP Politburo. Up to now no declassified Chinese sources indicate 
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that the Politburo reached any intervention resolution before October. Even after Mao 
sent a cable to Stalin on October 2, 1950 to inform him of CCP's decision to enter the 
war, there were still different opinions and debates within the CCP leadership as some 
of them worried about a possible defeat. 124 Further evidence is back in June, 1950, the 
CCP Military Committee decided to demobilize 1.4 million of its army in order to 
lower down the burden of military expenses and develop its civilian production. This 
order was actually carried out on June 21, 1950, only four days before the outbreak of 
the war. 125 The PLA demobilization in late June indicates that the CCP was not 
informed by Kim Il Sung of the exact date of the North Korean invasion and that the 
Chinese army was not ready for any large-scale military involvement at least in the 
summer of 1950. A third evidence is that in late August, Nie Rongzhen, the then PLA 
deputy Commander-in-chief made a suggestion to the CCP Central Committee to get 
prepared for a possible turnover of the situation in Korea. Based on his suggestion, 
the CCP Military Committee issued orders to move the Ninth Army Corps(20th, 26th 
and 27th armies) under the commander of Song Shilun from Fujian province into areas 
along the Jinpu Railway, and transfer the Nineteenth Army Corps( 63th, 64th and 65th 
armies) under the command of Yang Dezhi from Northwest China to areas along the 
Lunhai Railway. The Song Army Corps had been deployed in Fujian for the 
preparation of the Taiwan Campaign while the Yang Army Corps had just completed 
their tasks of wiping out the KMT remnants in the Northwest region. These two army 
corps were going to be used as the second echelon of the Northeastern Border Army. 
Arrangements were made along the southeast coast of China in case there was assault 
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from Taiwan. 126 August 26, Zhou Enlai, as the vice chairman of the CCP Military 
Committee, presided at a national defence meeting to check the preparations of the 
Northeastern Border Army. At this meeting decisions were made to order more 
military equipment so as to speed up the construction of China's air force, artillery 
units and armored troops. 127 Obviously, Mao himself was inclined to confront the 
United States, but not necessarily in Korea. 
September 7, Chai Chengwen, an military attache of the Chinese Embassy in 
Korea, was summoned back urgently to Beijing from Korea. He brought back with 
him a headline report which was prepared by the Chinese Ambassador to North Korea, 
Nie Zhiliang. This report analyzed North Korea's difficulty in continuing the war and 
the possibility of a U.S. landing in the rear of the North Korean Army. Nie's report 
was sent to Mao and other CCP leaders and caused much attention. Zhou Enlai and 
Lin Biao had interviews with Nie. Zhou was mostly concerned about the question of 
what would be the biggest problem if China had to enter the war. Nie answered that 
the biggest problem would be transportation, interpreters and supplies that the present 
conditions in Korea made it almost impossible for a large-scale military operation. 
Lin Biao's question was whether Kim 11 Sung was prepared to go on with guerrilla 
warfare in the mountains if China preferred not to send troops into Korea. While 
being unable to answer this question, Chai felt some controversy in the forthcoming 
decision by the CCP Politburo. 128 
However, China did not take the decisive step to get involved in the Korean 
conflict before the U.N. forces' landing at Inchon. There were several reasons. First, 
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the Chinese troops which were already deployed along the Yalu border were not 
completely ready although they had been pushed by Mao for early readiness. 
Secondly, there had been constant arguments within the CCP leadership about whether 
China should send troops into Korea, which hampered the decision making process. 
Lastly, the CCP leadership had been waiting for the request from Kim Il Sung for that 
but it did not come until after the Inchon landing. Evidently, the CCP leadership 
believed that Kim, as a staunch nationalist in both the Second World War and the 
Korean War, seemed to prefer to fight the war out with his own strength as long as 
the military situation was favorable to his troops. His attitude was understandable to 
the CCP leaders since they were nationalists themselves. Nevertheless, facing a 
nationalist like Kim Il Sung, the CCP had no other alternative but to wait until Kim 
could no longer hold on. 129 
SS 
CHAPTER IV 
AFTER INCHON LANDING 
The Inchon Landing took place on September 15, 1950 as expected by the 
Chinese leaders. In a few days the North Korean defense was crushed since they had 
been too confident for a complete victory and not prepared for such a setback. This 
caused great concern in the CCP. On September 17, South Korea President Rhee 
announced that the South Korean Army would continue the attack upon the remnants 
of the North Korean troops with or without U.S. assistance. 130 In the meantime, the 
CCP's appeal to participate in the U.N. discussions on the Korean issue was rejected. 
Under this new situation the CCP had to view the development of the Korean 
Conflict from a new respective: the safety of Manchuria bordering Korea could be 
severely threatened by U.N. forces' rapid advance and it was therefore very likely that 
China would need to use its armed forces to help North Korea, the idea being that if 
North Korea could hold on, there would be no problem to China's security. As I 
mentioned in earlier chapters, the CCP leadership believed that the United States was 
not trustful for its promises. On September 17, the CCP Military Committee decided 
to send a group of military officers to Korea in order "to get familiar with the general 
situation, make surveys of Korean topography, and prepare for future battle." 131 The 
same night, Gao Gang had a special meeting with Chai Chengwen who had been 
working as the Chinese military attache to North Korea and was going back to Korea 
with the PLA military officers. Gao Gang showed him a letter from Mao Zedong in 
which Mao said it was inevitable that troops be sent into Korea and preparations 
should be completed as soon as possible. 132 We should give credit to Chai Chengwen 
for the credibility of this top secret message from Mao himself. Chai participated in 
the Panmunjom Negotiations as one of the Chinese negotiation officials. After his 
retirement from the Army he devoted himself to international strategy research. In 
1993 he published "Panmunjom Negotiations" which is regarded in China as one of 
the most authentic works on the Korean War. Mao's idea of the Korean situation 
could be explained for the following reasons: 1) the Chinese lacked reliable 
information about the real intention of the U.N. troops; 2)Mao purposely exaggerated 
the possibility of U.S. invasion into mainland China because he needed this to stir up 
internal sentiment and strengthen his control at home; and 3)Mao knew Kim 11 Song's 
troops were no match for U.N. troops --- they would eventually be crushed. 
Although Mao himself was inclined to join the war as soon as possible, other 
members of the CCP leadership preferred to wait in order to make better preparations. 
On september 20, approved by Mao, Zhou Enlai sent a personal letter to Kim 11 Sung, 
suggesting that the war was going to be protracted. It had better be conducted on the 
basis of self-reliance. Zhou further proposed that in every campaign and battle, 
temporary superiority in both manpower and firepower must be concentrated so as to 
break up and destroy the enemy. Only by weakening the enemy gradually, could a 
protracted war be carried out. 133 Zhou's letter to Kim shows that by September 22, the 
CCP had not made the final decision yet. The CCP still hoped Kim 11 Sung could hold 
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on. However, one decision was immediately made by the CCP. They decided that 
warnings should be sent out to the enemy first before China actually entered the war. 
This strategy aimed to deter the United States, letting it know that China was serious 
about the matter. The CCP was hoping that the United States would stop at the 38th 
parallel after they got these threats. China was still open to the idea of settling the 
Korean problem via negotiation because no Chinese leader was confident that they 
could guarantee victory if China declared war on the United States. 134 
When Seoul was re-captured by the U.N. forces, China got word from the Indian 
Premier Nehru that the U.N. forces would not cross the 38th parallel. 135 Before that 
the CCP had held meetings to discuss the possibility whether the United States would 
stop at the 38th parallel and tum to diplomatic means to solve the problem. Nehru 
told China that the answer was "Yes" -- the U.N. forces would not cross the line 
unless they were instructed by the United Nations. 136 The information provided by the 
CCP Intelligence Department had a different interpretation -- From September 12 to 
September 18, the foreign ministers of the United States, France and Great Britain held 
meetings in New York. At the meetings Dean Acheson tried to convince the other 
two foreign ministers about the importance and necessity of crossing the 38th parallel. 
The three foreign ministers reached common understanding about the issue finally. 137 
This information made the CCP leaders believe that the United States was attempting 
to hold China from taking any action before the U.N. forces wiped out North Korean 
Army .138 Based on this information, the CCP leaders thought they were made a fool 
of by India and the United States. 
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In his Reminiscences, MacArthur explained the prevalent opinion in the United 
States at that time: "When, after Inchon, no diplomatic action looking toward peace 
seemed to be forthcoming, diverse views began to appear among the members of the 
United Nations. The United States took the position that if the North Korean Army 
was not completely destroyed, and peace and order restored in the northern half of the 
peninsula, South Korea would live indefinitely beneath the threat of renewed 
Communist aggression." 139 This argument was the basis of the strategy to cross the 
3 8th parallel so as to wipe out the remnants of the North Korean Army. 
On September 27, 1950, the Indian Ambassador Panikkar made a request to see 
General Nie Rongzhen, the deputy Commander-in-chief of the PLA. In their meeting 
they discussed the updated developments of the Korean War. Panikkar seemed to 
mention an incident of the Third Chinese Civil War by chance. He recalled that when 
Nanjing was taken by the PLA in 1949, MacArthur once told a U.S. News Agency 
reporter: " Give me 500 air planes and they will be crushed." 140 MacArthur apparently 
referred to the Chinese Communists as "them". To Panikkar's question, General Ni e's 
answer was: "We even regard the atomic bomb as 'a paper tiger', not to say a few 
hundred air planes." 141 Panikkar frankly told Nie that the major industry of China was 
either along the eastern coast or in Manchuria. When war occurred, these industrial 
installations would easily be damaged, which would delay China' economic 
development for at least 8 to 10 years. Nie answered that if the United States chose to 
have war with China, China would have no other alternative but to resist. He also 
pointed out that this was only one side of the question. On the other hand, the 
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imperialists had their own weak points. China's task was how to maintain peace and 
prevent the war from happening and expanding. 142 
What his real purpose in this interview was, Panikkar did not mention in his 
autobiography. The CCP's interpretation was that he mentioned MacArthur's statement 
of the fall of Nanjing on purpose as it was good timing with Truman Administration's 
preparations to cross the 38th parallel -- Panikkar seized on the MacArthur statement 
to exaggerate the risk of war with the United States or give China some hint that 
China had better not get involved directly. 143 
In his memoirs, Panikkar also mentions that General Nie made it clear to him that 
"China did not want to sit back with folded hands and let the Americans come up to 
their border" 144 which gave Panikkar the impression that "the Chinese proposed to 
intervene in the war." 145 General Nie also expressed China's determination to carry out 
the war at any costs: 
We know what we are in for, but at all costs American aggression has to be 
stopped. The Americans can bomb us, they can destroy our industries, but 
they cannot defeat us on land .... They may even drop atom bombs on us. 
What then? They may kill a few million people .... China lives on the farms. 
What can atom bombs do there? Yes, our economic development will be put 
back. We may have to wait for it. 146 
Nie's words should be dealt with as an official statement by the Chinese 
Government. By that time Nie was one of the three vice Chairmen of the PLA 
Military Committee which was the supreme agency to make strategic decisions. 
In order to make sure the United States got the exact message the CCP aimed to 
get across, Zhou Enlai made a formal statement on the Korean issue on September 30, 
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1950, at the Chinese People's Political Consultation Conference's Celebration 
Ceremony for the 1st anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. 
Zhou declared: " ... the Chinese people .... want to rehabilitate and develop their 
industrial and agricultural production and cultural and educational work in a peaceful 
environment, free from threats. But if the American aggressors take this as a sign of 
the weakness of the Chinese people, they will commit the same fatal blunder as the 
Kuomintang reactionaries. The Chinese people love peace; in order to defend peace, 
they are never scared in their resistance to foreign invasions; the Chinese people will 
not tolerate any foreign aggression nor will they supinely tolerate seeing their 
neighbors being savagely invaded by the imperialists. "147 Zhou's speech caused a 
significant response from the foreign news media which captured the important 
information in his speech. It served as an ultimatum to the U.N. forces --- China was 
for a peaceful solution of the Korean problem but it would not tolerate the U.N. forces 
crossing the 38th parallel. If the United States should do so, China would intervene 
with all its strength. 
China's warnings were apparently ignored by the United States as the U.N. forces 
were continuing to advance northward. The Truman Administration seemed to be 
willing to risk a clash with China and gambled on a possible complete victory. On 
September 27, General Marshall suggested to the President that he should authorize 
MacArthur to advance north of the 3 8th parallel. It was approved immediately by the 
President. On September 29, Marshall sent a telegram to MacArthur, instructing him 
that "We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of 
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the 38th parallel." 148 On September 30, the Third Division of the South Korean Army 
crossed the 38th parallel. On October 1, MacArthur issued his ultimatum to the North 
Korean Army to surrender: 
The early and total defeat and complete destruction of your armed forces and 
war-making potential is now inevitable .... I ... call upon you and the forces 
under your command ... to lay down your arms and cease hostilities under 
such military supervision as I may direct .... to avoid the further useless 
shedding of blood and destruction of property. 149 
This ultimatum was unacceptable to North Korea. At midnight of October 1, Kim 
11 Sung met the Chinese Ambassador Ni Zhiliang crucially. He said: "MacArthur 
demanded me to raise our hands but we never have such a habit. "150 Then Kim 11 
Sung and Piao Xian Yong (Vice premier of North Korea and at one time the leader of 
the Korean Communist Party in the south) made a joint request to the Chinese 
Communist Party for help, hoping China could dispatch the Thirteenth Army Corps 
across the Yalu River as soon as possible. 151 In the cable Kim sent to Mao and the 
CCP, He said: " .... the landing troops of the enemy have cut off our connections with 
our troops in the south, some of them have been wrapped up by the enemy .... The 
enemy is intending to advance further north ..... We are trying every means to prevent 
our country from being colonialized by shedding the last drop of our blood ..... If the 
enemy ... advances to attack areas north of the 3 8th parallel, it is extremely difficult 
for us to stop it by our own strength. Therefore, we have to make an urgent request to 
you for special help from China -- We hope you can send the PLA to help us fight the 
enemy directly when the enemy attacks areas north of the 3 8th parallel." 152 
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The CCP and Mao Zedong then realized that the North Koreans could hardly hold 
on. If they did not offer to help to Kim Il Sung, North Korea would perish soon. 
After reading the cable from Kim II Sung, Mao immediately consulted Zhou Enlai and 
Liu Shaoqi. After brief discussion they made the decision that China should send part 
of the PLA under the title of Chinese Volunteers into Korea to fight the United 
Nations. This decision was approved by the CCP Politburo at once. The Chinese 
People's Volunteer Army was actually composed of the same units of the People's 
Liberation Army except the title. They were designated "Volunteers" out of the 
consideration of the Soviet Union which was bound by the recently signed Sino-Soviet 
Mutual Assistance Treaty to intervene if China was in a state of war with a third 
party, something Stalin was quite reluctant to do. A Chinese army composed of 
"volunteers" could save the Soviet Union this obligation since ostensibly the Chinese 
Government had nothing to do with these "volunteers". Secondly, the title of the 
Chinese People's Volunteer Army might not give the United States any excuse to 
declare war on China, to expand the war into Manchuria, or launch the third World 
War at its will. Mao and other Chinese leaders were clear that a third world war was 
just what Chiang Kai-shek had been expecting because only a general war between the 
United States and the Chinese Communists could possibly bring back his power. 153 
Thirdly, a general war definitely would increase U.S. military assistance to Chiang 
Kai-shek and form a greater menace to China's security. 154 Lastly, it also showed that 
the CCP leaders intended to limit the conflict within a local or regional scope. 
On October 2, 1950, Mao sent a cable to Stalin, informing him of China's 
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decision to dispatch combat troops into North Korea: "We have decided to send part 
of the armed forces into Korea, under the title of Volunteer Army .... If we allow the 
United States to occupy all of Korea, Korean revolutionary power will suffer a 
fundamental defeat, and the American invaders will run rampant, and have negative 
effects for the entire Far East." 155 This cable showed the determination of the CCP to 
contain the spread of capitalism by the United States at any costs: " ... since Chinese 
troops will fight American troops in Korea, we must be prepared for the United States 
to declare and enter a state of war with China. We must be prepared that the United 
States may, at a minimum, use its air force to bomb many major cities and industrial 
centers in China, and use its navy to assault the coastal region." 156 Mao's anticipation 
of the worst possible development of the intervention was that the Chinese Army 
would be "unable to destroy the American forces of large number, the two armies 
[were] in mutual deadlock, and the United States had already entered an open state of 
war with China, leading to the destruction of the economic development plan we have 
already begun." 157 
According to Chai Chengwen, a Chinese military attache in Korea, no order was 
issued to the Thirteenth Army Corps to advance into Korea after Mao Zedong made 
the decision, nor was North Korea informed of it. 158 The reason was that the CCP did 
not want to make any rash move before it could guarantee sufficient military 
assistance from the Soviet Union in terms of military equipment and Soviet air cover 
as had been promised by Stalin during Mao's stay in Moscow. Mao hesitated for a 
while because this was a big decision concerning the lives of hundreds of thousands of 
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people. If China won the war, there was nothing to lose; If China could not win it, it 
would be a danger to threaten the stability of the government or even to lose the 
control of the whole country. 159 Mao also told Stalin that the Chinese People's 
Volunteer Army was going to enter Korea on October 15, 1950(1t was postponed to 
October 19, 1950 due to supply and transportation problems). 12 divisions(already 
transferred to south Manchuria) were going to be dispatched as the first attacking 
group, numbering 260,000 men. In this cable it was clear that the CCP did regard the 
38th parallel as the limit for the U.N. forces' advance northward as Mao asserted: 
"They(the 12 divisions) will be stationed in appropriate districts of North Korea, not 
necessarily all the way to the 38th parallel. While they do combat with enemy who 
dares to advance north of the 38th parallel... they will await the arrival of Soviet 
weapons ... and then coordinate with Korean comrades for a counterattack, destroying 
the invading American Army." Mao also confirmed that he was going to transfer 
another 24 divisions "in order to form the second and third waves of military forces to 
assist Korea." 160 
In the light of this decision, Zhou Enlai called the Indian Ambassador Panikkar 
for another urgent interview at 1 AM October 3, aiming to inform the United States 
of this decision via Panikkar whom the Chinese leaders regarded as an unofficial 
diplomatic channel. At that time India was the only country through which China 
could get across its important message to the United States as India was keeping fairly 
good official relations with both China and the United States. Zhou told Panikkar: 
"Among the questions brought forth by your Premier Nehru in the last interview one 
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was very urgent. It was the issue of Korea. The United States is intended to cross the 
38th parallel and to enlarge the war. If they really want to do so, we can not stand 
idly watching. China would surely interfere. Please convey this to your Premier." 161 
Zhou then added: "We stand for a peaceful solution of the Korean Problem, and make 
it a local issue. We are still holding this opinion. The Korean War must be stopped; 
Foreign troops must be withdrawn, which will be beneficial for the peace in the 
East." 162 When Panikkar asked whether China intended to intervene if only the South 
Koreans crossed the parallel, Zhou made it very clear: "The South Koreans do not 
matter but American intrusion into North Korea would encounter Chinese 
resistance. "163 
The CCP hoped that this message could reach the White House through Panikkar. 
It did actually. But the Truman Administration did not take it seriously because 
Panikkar was not a person credible for this information as he "in the past played the 
game of Chinese Communists fairly regularly, so that his statement could not be taken 
as that of an impartial observer." 164 Based on this argument, the threatening warning 
from China was regarded only as "a bald attempt to blackmail the United Nations by 
threats of intervention in Korea." 165 
Although Mao was determined to confront the United States and help North 
Korea and it was approved by the CCP Politburo, there were obviously different 
opinions in the CCP Politburo. In order to reach a common understanding of the 
strategy, the CCP held a series of meetings at Yiniantang of Zhongnanhai( where Mao 
and other CCP leaders lived)from October 2 to 8, 1950. Those who were present at 
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the meetings included Chairmen of the major regions of China, and CCP Politburo 
members. On October 3, Mao made the decision to summon Peng Dehuai to fly to 
Beijing from Xian( where he was the Chairman of the Northwestern Region 
Government). 166 
At one of the meetings Zhou Enlai analyzed the intention of the United States as 
"by using the bases in Japan, the United States inherited the adventurism of the 
Japanese militarists, following the history since the war of 1895 and took the track of 
conquering China, namely, to occupy North-east China(Manchuria) before annexing 
China and to occupy Korea before grabbing North-east China .... For us, the Korean 
question is not simply a question concerning Korea, it is related to the Taiwan issue. 
The U.S. imperialists have adopted a hostile attitude towards us and set up their 
defence line in the Taiwan Strait while paying lip service to non-aggression and non-
intervention. From information we got, they wanted to calm China first and after 
occupying North Korea, they will come to attack China." 167 
Zhou's analysis was quite acceptable at that time in the CCP. It again proved that 
the issue of their territory security was the priority concern in the CCP's policy making 
procedure in early 1950. However, no declassified U.S. governmental documents yet 
show that the United States was intending to invade China after occupying Manchuria 
before China's intervention. 
At another meeting, both Mao and Zhou expressed the concern that even if the 
United States did not attack [China] immediately, it could establish a hostile regime on 
the Korean peninsula and deploy its troops along the Sino-Korean border to exert 
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military pressure that would be a major threat to northeastern China and that it was 
very hard to defend the border of North-east China which is more than one thousand 
kilo-meters long. How many troops would be enough to defend the Sino-Korean 
border? It was also not applicable "to wait there year after year without knowing 
when the enemy will come." 168 Both Mao and Zhou agreed that a passive defence was 
almost impossible. Then Zhou quoted the French News Agency that the United States 
would go to defend other important areas such Taiwan and Indo-China when the 
Korean War was over. If that news was true, China would have to confront the 
United States either in Taiwan Strait or in Viet Nam. If China wanted to break the 
three-direction encirclement by the United States(from Viet Nam, Taiwan, and Korea ), 
it was better to fight the U.S. in Korea as it was mountainous and favorable for 
China's mobile warfare strategy. 169 
When Mao asked those who were opposed to intervention to summarize their 
points, Gao Gang stressed China's inferior economic potential, inferior military power 
and much less consolidated rear defense. Gao Gang and Lin Biao shared the opinion 
that China had better adopt a strategy of strengthening the border defence as the 
Chinese Army could not compete with the U.S. Army. To plunge into the war 
without sufficient military strength was equal to bringing the trouble to China. 
Obviously, nobody could guarantee a victory for a war with the United States. This 
point was supported by some of the CCP Politburo members at the meeting. 170 Some 
Politburo members pointed out that the United States had emerged from the Second 
World War as the most powerful country in the world. Its annual steel output in 1949 
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reached 87.72 million tons, which was more than 144 times that of China. The 
difference between the two countries was even greater in electricity, petroleum, other 
industrial products and grain output while in 1949, China's agriculture and industry 
could barely satisfy its domestic needs. 171 They quoted the above figures in order to 
prove that China could not afford a large-scale war. Other Politburo members held the 
opinion that it was better to ask the Soviet Union to intervene instead since the Soviet 
Army was better equipped. Besides, the unstable political situation in the newly-
liberated areas of China was still a major threat to the existence of the people's 
Republic of China -- there were constant sabotage activities initiated by the KMT 
remnants in the Southwest region. And other CCP politburo members held the 
opinion that the major threat was from Taiwan, not from Korea. 172 Despite the 
different viewpoints mentioned above, most of the CCP leaders at the meeting shared 
the fear of the United States' military strength in terms of its air and naval dominance 
and the atomic bomb. The Chinese Army's firepower on the ground was also inferior 
to that of the U.S. Army -- in 1950, one PLA Army Corps had 198 artillery pieces, 
about one tenth that of the similar American unit which possessed 1428 artillery 
pieces. 173 
When Mao suggested Lin Biao as the Chinese Volunteers' commander, Lin 
declined, with an excuse of illness -- the actual reason was that Lin was afraid that he 
might not win a war with the United States, which would disgrace the military merits 
he gained in the past. Lin soon left Beijing for Moscow on a recuperation trip. Mao 
later told Peng Dehuai that Lin Biao was over-cautious in micro strategy, lacking 
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aggressiveness in macro strategy. 174 
In late 1952, Liu Shaoqi, while on his official visit in Moscow for the Nineteenth 
Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, told Wang Ming(former CCP 
general secretary) that Mao was "wracked by indecision even after the [U.N. forces'] 
Inchon landing and the initial U.S.(This should be U.N. here but unfortunately, all 
Chinese sources recorded it as U.S.) thrust across the 38th parallel." 175 According to 
Liu Shaoqi, Mao did not want to fully engage the U.S. forces unless he was forced 
to.116 
Mao's unwillingness to confront the United States on a large scale did not mean 
that he preferred to wait or look on. He agreed to the disadvantages for intervention 
brought forward at the meeting but said: "What you have said sounds reasonable. But 
it would be shameful for us to stand by seeing our neighbors in perilous danger 
without offering any help." 177 Mao told his cadres that if China let the United States 
occupy North Korea without doing anything, "internationalism would be empty 
talk. n11s 
In fact North Korean Communists offered great help to the CCP in the 1940s --
Kim 11 Sung himself fought the Japanese as the vice commander of the Chinese 
Northeastern Anti-Japanese Army in Manchuria in the second World War;179 in the 
Third Chinese Civil War, when the PLA was temporarily retreating under great KMT 
military pressure in southern Manchuria, Kim let the Chinese Communists use Korean 
territory as a preparation base for counterattacks later. 180 
Mao again emphasized that there were some advantages in fighting the United 
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States in Korea. Mao believed that according to the situation as it developed in 
Korea, a direct confrontation with the United States was inevitable. After Truman's 
dispatch of the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait and MacArthur made belligerent 
remarks on Taiwan, such a confrontation was but a matter of time. Mao pointed out 
that among the three most likely fronts where the United States might attack China 
were Korea, Viet Nam and Taiwan. Mao thought Korea was a better place to 
counterattack the U.S. because it was mountainous and covered with thick 
forests(which favored China's mobile strategy and did not favor the U.S. mechanized 
troops), and because it is close to the Soviet Union and Manchuria. 181 
As the conclusion, Mao asserted: " The question now is not whether we should 
send troops to Korea or not, but how fast we can do this. One day's difference will be 
crucial to the whole situation. Today we will discuss two urgent questions -- when 
should our troops enter Korea and who should be the commander." 182 At this meeting 
Peng Dehuai was considered to be the CPV commander. 183 
Peng Dehuai arrived in Beijing at 4 p.m. October 4, 1950. 184 He was immediately 
asked to attend the meetings of the CCP Politburo. Mao's remarks deeply impressed 
Peng. After spending a sleepless night in Beijing Hotel, Peng appeared to be a firm 
supporter of Mao at the resumed meeting next afternoon. Peng stated his own opinion 
that it was absolutely necessary for China to enter the war to help North Korea. He 
argued that if China could not defeat the United States, the worst thing would be that 
we would lose power in China and we have to fight Chiang Kai-shek all over again. 
However, if the United States was allowed to deploy its troops in Korea along the 
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Yalu River border and on Taiwan, it was very convenient for it to invade China with 
any excuse. 185 Peng then argued that at that time the whole situation was more 
favorable to China because the United States needed a quick war while China 
preferred a protracted war; that the United States was only good at regular wars while 
the PLA was good at guerilla warfare while Korea's mountainous geography was more 
suitable for guerilla wars; and that spiritually, the socialist camp was more powerful 
than the capitalist camp. Peng then added that if China did not send troops to Korea, 
how could the strength of the socialist camp be shown to the world?186 Feeling more 
confident, Mao once again pointed out that the Korean problem concerned not only the 
security of China, but also the fate of the confrontation between the socialist camp and 
the imperialist camp in the east. Mao said the superiority of China lay in its 
manpower, moral strength and firm support from people at home, which would 
compensate for China's unfavorable factors in weapon and equipment. 187 
On October 7, 1950, the United Nations Security Council passed its second 
resolution on the Korean issue, authorizing its members to "take all appropriate steps" 
to restore peace in Korea. The same day U.S. troops crossed the 38th parallel. This 
resolution aimed to unify Korea. The CCP leadership realized that its serious 
warnings to the United States did not work and it was impossible to reach a peaceful 
solution of the Korean problem when the U.N. forces advanced to the 38th parallel. 188 
On October 8, Mao issued the order to send the CPV into Korea. The order said: 
" .... in order to safeguard the interests of the Korean people, the interests of the 
Chinese people, and the interests of all the peoples in the East, the Northeastern 
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Border army is now transformed into the Chinese People's Volunteer Army and must 
set out to move into Korea and fight the invaders side by side with the Korean 
comrades towards a glorious victory .... "189 According to this order, the CPV was 
composed of the 38th, 39th, 40th and 42nd armies( under the command of the 
Thirteenth Army Corps), and the Northeastern Border Army Artillery 
Headquarters(under whose command there were the 1st, 2nd and 8th artillery 
divisions). Peng Dehuai was appointed to be the commander-in-chief of the CPV; Gao 
Gang, as the commander and political commissar of the Northeastern Army Region, 
was ordered to take charge of the rear-area supporting work, namely, food and 
ammunition supplies, and transportation. 190 
The same day, Mao sent a cable to Ni Zhiliang, the Chinese Ambassador to North 
Korea, asking him to inform Kim Il Sung of the CCP's decision to send troops and the 
suggestion for Korea to send Piao Yi Yu to Shenyang to discuss with Peng Dehuai 
about coordination between the North Korean Army and the CPV. Peng flew to the 
CPV headquarters in Shenyang at once. 191 
Almost at the same time when Mao issued this order, the CCP received a cable 
from Stalin which informed the CCP that the Soviet air force was not ready for 
coordination with the CPV in Korea. 192 Mao and Zhou Enlai felt surprised and 
frustrated. Mao said to Zhou: "We have to think over this matter all over again." 193 
After a short discussion, it was decided that Zhou should go to Moscow to meet Stalin 
at once. 
Zhou set off for Moscow immediately, accompanied by Shi Zhe, Zhou's 
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interpreter, and Kang Yimin, Zhou's secretary. Zhou was joined by Lin Biao in 
Moscow who was staying there for medical treatment. The next day Zhou and Lin 
went to Stalin's residence and had an interview with him. According to Shi Zhe, the 
atmosphere of the interview was at first a bit tense because they were not sure of each 
other's intentions. Stalin first presented a brief analysis of the Korean War situation. 
Then Zhou Enlai dissembled, saying that the Chinese leadership was constantly being 
informed of the Korean War situation. Then he expressed the CCP's opinion that Mao 
Zedong and the CCP Politburo had decided not to send ground forces into Korea since 
China did not have air force available, nor had China's economy fully recovered from 
damages of war in the last two decades. Besides, if China could not win a quick 
victory in Korea, it would involve more friendly countries (referring to other 
communist countries that would assist China). 194 What Zhou said was only an excuse. 
The real implication was if China could not get enough Soviet air cover for its ground 
forces, China would not enter the war as it would cost much more Chinese lives. 
Stalin understood this hint immediately. He said that the Soviet Union had not only 
withdrawn all its troops from Korea but had openly stated there was a complete 
withdrawal of its troops from Korea. Now it was very difficult for the Soviet Army to 
reenter Korea as it was equal to confronting the United States directly. 195 
What Stalin really feared was that any violation of the sphere of influence agreed 
upon at the Yalta conference would start the third world war. Shi Zhe recalled that 
Stalin suggested a solution to the problem that it was better to send part of the 
Chinese Army into the war and the Soviet Union would provide weapons and other 
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kinds of equipment. Stalin also agreed to provide limited air cover for the Chinese 
ground forces but the Soviet airplanes would only protect the CPV's rear areas and 
would not go deep into the enemy's areas. Stalin argued that if the Soviet airplanes 
were knocked down by the U.S. and the Soviet pilots were captured, it would give the 
whole world the impression that the Soviet Union was directly involved in the 
conflict. 196 Stalin then made further suggestions of how to coordinate. He implied that 
the Soviet Union was still holding large quantities of left-over weapons and 
ammunition from the Second World War and Korea was a suitable place to use 
them. 197 However, this interpretation by Shi Zhe seemed to be contradictory to the 
resolution(to enter the Korean War)reached by the CCP Politburo one day before. 
Other sources have a different interpretation on this. Those sources show that 
Stalin did have a meeting with Zhou Enlai. The meeting lasted from 7 p.m. October 9 
to 5 a.m. October 10. Zhou started, as planned with Mao, to discuss with Stalin the 
actual number of fighters and bombers the Soviet Union could dispatch into Korea and 
who should command these airplanes. When Zhou mentioned this to Stalin, the latter 
replied that the Soviet air force could not be sent to Korea now because it needed 
more time to get ready. However, Stalin promised to deliver military equipment for 
20 Chinese divisions first. Zhou tried his best to change Stalin's mind but failed. 
Having no intention to offend Stalin, Zhou tactfully expressed the CCP's opinion that 
if the Soviet Union could not provide air cover, China was unable to enter the Korean 
War. 198 Stalin said that the air cover matter could be further discussed later and he 
ordered his foreign minister to inform the Soviet Joint Chiefs of Staff to speed up the 
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training of the Chinese air force. Then Stalin asked Zhou whether they should inform 
Kim Il Sung to be prepared to set up their exile government in Tonghua area of 
Manchuria. Realizing the dilemma facing both China and the Soviet Union, Stalin 
said that the best solution of the Korean problem was the invasion (U.N. forces' 
advance north of the 38th parallel) be stopped and a world war avoided on the basis 
that this solution would not hurt either China's or Soviet interests. 199 Seeing that it 
was almost impossible to change Stalin's mind, Zhou left Stalin's residence and 
immediately cabled Mao Zedong for further instructions. 200 
After receiving confirmed information of the Sudden change of the Soviets, Mao 
and other CCP leaders were wondering if they should go ahead on their own without 
protection of the Soviet air force. Mao cabled to Peng Dehuai, Gao Gang and other 
CPV generals at 8 p.m. October 12, 1950, asking them to stop all intervention 
preparations. Peng and Gao were ordered to go back to Beijing immediately to attend 
a Politburo meeting.201 Before Peng Dehuai left Shenyang for Beijing, he had met the 
North Korean security minister Piao Yi Yu who hurried there on October 12. He 
informed Peng that after crossing the 38th parallel, the U.N. forces and South Korean 
troops were quickly advancing to the north. The North Korean Army with only 
50,000 soldiers retreated from the south. Kim 11 Sung and the Korean Communist 
Party asked the CCP to send the CPV into Korea as soon as possible. 202 
The CCP Politburo held an emergency meeting on October 13 to discuss whether 
China should cross the Yalu River without Soviet air support. The meeting lasted 
overnight. At last Mao and other CCP leaders decided that they should go on without 
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Soviet air support as they all realized that they should make some sacrifice to defend 
their territory and to save their newly founded regime. Peng Dehuai at once called 
Xie Fang, his chief of staff, to continue preparations for the first CPV units to cross 
the Yalu River. 203 
This decision meant China would make more sacrifices without Soviet air cover. 
The quick decision of the CCP also suggested that the CCP used the non-intervention 
policy as a bargaining term in Zhou's meeting with Stalin in order to get more Soviet 
military assistance. Nevertheless, the sudden change of Stalin's attitude made the CCP 
believe that Stalin was a selfish person. This left a deep gap between the two parties, 
which eventually led to the total split of relations in the middle of the l 960's. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE FINAL DECISION 
On October 13, 1950, Mao sent a cable to Zhou Enlai in Moscow, informing 
him that the majority of the CCP Politburo members were in favor of direct Chinese 
entry into the Korean War even without Soviet air support: " I have consulted with 
comrades in the Politburo. We unanimously believe that having our troops enter 
Korea is still more advantageous . . . . In the first stage we can concentrate on wiping 
out the puppet army (South Korean Army), for we may deal with the South Koreans 
with certainty. We can establish bases in the vast mountainous areas north to the line 
between Wonsan and Pyongyang. This will surely encourage the Korean people. As 
long as we can destroy a few divisions of the puppet army, the Korean situation can 
take a tum to our advantage. The above positive policy will be very advantageous to 
China, to Korea, and to the East. 11204 
Mao further stated: "If we don't send troops, allowing the enemy to press to the 
Yalu Border and the arrogance of reactionaries at home and abroad to grow, this will 
be disadvantageous to all sides. Above all it will be most disadvantageous to 
Manchuria; all of the South Manchuria electricity will be destroyed. "205 
Zhou Enlai studied this cable very carefully and ordered it to be translated into 
Russian at once. Then Zhou made arrangements to meet Molotov and requested for 
an emergency interview with Stalin. The same evening, Zhou met Molotov who said 
the message had been sent to Stalin but so far there was no reply. Zhou did not 
mention his earlier request to have a meeting with Stalin. Instead Zhou brought forth 
the matter of what equipment and weapons the CPV needed. Molotov replied that 
since Stalin had already discussed with Zhou the issue of dispatching Chinese 
Volunteers into Korea, there should be no problem regarding Soviet military assistance 
but he stressed that everything should be decided by Stalin himself. When the actual 
number of artillery pieces and tanks the Chinese side needed was discussed, Molotov 
said it seemed to him there was some difference between the figures Zhou was using 
this time and the figures discussed last time(implying Zhou was cheating), which 
triggered some argument between the two sides. Then they discussed the issues of 
transportation, equipment delivery and reception, as well as how to stock these 
supplies. 206 
When Stalin learned the news, he was surprised and deeply moved by the 
Chinese' spirit of sacrifice. On October 14, he sent a cable to Zhou Enlai to express 
his thanks for the decision made by the Chinese because this sacrificing move saved 
Stalin out of the dilemma --- he did not want to see North Korea totally crushed by 
the U.N. forces --- a powerful and stable North Korea would be an ideal buffer zone 
between the Soviet Union and hostile countries(South Korea, Japan and the United 
States)~ nor did he want to send troops or air cover into Korea, which might cause a 
third world war which he could not afford. After receiving the cable, Zhou sent a 
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cable to Stalin with a list of orders for the first group of artillery pieces and peripheral 
instruments. Two days later, Zhou left Moscow for Beijing. 207 
In one of his articles, Shi Zhe mentioned one important fact that during Zhou's 
negotiations with Molotov and Stalin, only the quantity of equipment and ammunition 
was mentioned. As pressed by the urgent situation, nobody mentioned the issue of 
prices. On the plane back to Beijing, Zhou said that the Chinese accepted the Soviet 
military assistance only as part of their material support for the Korean War, which 
meant China need not pay for it. Zhou said he would talk to Stalin at their next 
meeting in order to reach mutual understanding on the matter. Unfortunately, Zhou 
never had the chance to talk to Stalin again. As a matter of fact, Stalin never officially 
mentioned that these military supplies should be paid for by China. This matter was 
not settled until the early l 960's when Nikita Khrushchev suddenly asked the Chinese 
to pay for it in full. 208 
From the strategic angle, Mao believed that there were advantages in sending 
troops into Korea. His arguments were as follows: 
1. Korea was the weak point in America's global strategy. Although the United 
States was pursuing a strategy of global containment of Communism, its priority was 
still in Europe where the Soviet Union was its major opponent. The military 
deployment of the United States in 49 countries made its already inadequate military 
forces even more thinly spread. The war in Korea would definitely disrupt the United 
States' strategic priorities and overstretch its defense line. Obviously it could not 
afford to fight a protracted war in Korea due to its ill-balanced strategy, limited 
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manpower, low morale and the reluctance of its allies. 209 
2. The power of the atomic bomb was limited. The limited number of atomic 
bombs possessed by the United States would not produce a perilous effect on the vast 
territory of China. Besides, the Soviet Union already had their own atomic bomb. It 
was no longer monopolized by the United States. In Korea, it would be more 
difficult to use the atomic weapons since it might hurt its allies on the narrow 
peninsula. Mao called the atomic bomb a "paper tiger". Still, the CCP put much 
consideration on its possible consequences -- China was prepared to sacrifice a few 
million of its people, some coastal cities, the power plants on the Yalu River and the 
postponement of its economic recovery program.210 
3. The geographical conditions of Korea were unfavorable to the United States. 
Korea is a narrow mountainous peninsula, which would greatly limit the mobility of 
MacArthur's mechanized troops but it would be advantageous to China's infantry 
troops. Supply would be another serious problem for MacArthur since he had to get 
most of his supplies from the United States -- more than I 0,000 miles away while 
Chinese troops could be supplied either from Manchuria or directly from the Soviet 
Union over a much shorter distance.211 
Even after the order was given to the CPV to enter Korea, Mao still hoped to 
conclude hostilities with the United States as soon as possible. Some sources show 
that between October 11 and 13, Mao did not have any sleep for about 60 hours 
because he had made a very big and very difficult decision in a short time. Mao was 
aware that if China could not win this war with the United States, the consequence 
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would be unthinkable. 212 Distracted by the sudden change of Stalin's strategy, Mao 
hesitated even at the final moment. Having asked the first group of the CPV to enter 
Korea no later than October 17, Mao sent a cable to Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang, 
asking them to come back to Beijing again for a discussion of the situation.213 
Finally, Mao was convinced that this confrontation was inevitable and it was 
better to get troops into Korea before Kim II Sung retreated to China with his 
government in exile. 214 The date for the CPV to enter Korea was postponed from 
October 17 to October 19, 1950.215 The reason for this postponement was that the 
CPV could not complete the preparations according to official Chinese sources. 
Another possible reason could be that Mao hesitated until the very last moment. 
In the meantime, Mao sent an order to Chen Yi, Commander-in-chief of the PLA 
East China Military Region to move the Ninth Army Corps into Manchuria. 
Arrangements were made to prevent losses if the United States should declare war 
upon China, or send its air force to bombard China's big cities and industrial bases and 
use its navy to attack the coastal areas of China. The few divisions of China's small 
air force and all the anti-aircraft artillery regiments were deployed around the big 
coastal cities like Shenyang, Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Nanjing and Guangzhou. 
Major industrial equipment and strategic materials were removed into remote areas of 
China. Mao gave instructions to the CCP East China Bureau and Central South 
Bureau to speed up the land reform and clearance of KMT remnants and four PLA 
Armies were stationed in Fujian and Guangdong so as to concentrate on a possible 
landing of Chiang's troops from Taiwan.216 Mao especially pointed out: "All the work 
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of the Party in East China should be directed under the assumption that the United 
States and Chiang Kai-shek are going to attack us" and "Guangdong and Guangxi 
provinces should be regarded as one unit in dealing with Chiang's assaults."217 Mao's 
words clearly defined the priority concern of the Communist Party for their territory. 
Facing the crucial fact that the CPV troops would not be protected from air 
attacks in Korea, Mao and the CCP leadership had to restrict their strategic goals in 
the first stage of the war. Mao sent a cable to Zhou on October 14, informing him 
briefly that the CPV troops were going to take a defensive position for the first 
campaign -- a defensive perimeter would be established from Pyongyang to Wonsan in 
order to keep bases as the starting points for future offenses. Mao stated that only 
when all preparations were completed would they launch a counter-offensive.218 
In the meantime when the Chinese Communists kept sending warnings to the 
United States not to cross the 38th parallel, President Harry Truman, being skeptical of 
these warnings, felt it necessary to meet General MacArthur. On October 12, General 
Marshall informed MacArthur that the President would like to meet him shortly at 
Honolulu but he was told that "if the situation in Korea is such that you feel you 
should not absent yourself for the time involved in such a long trip, I am sure the 
President would be glad to go on to meet you at Wake Island."219 The General replied 
that he would like to meet the President at Wake Island. 220 
Before this meeting, different views began to appear among the members of the 
United Nations concerning a peace settlement in Korea. Some Western countries, 
headed by Great Britain, were opposed to sending U.N. troops into the north and 
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preferred a peaceful settlement since "the original objective of the Security Council 
had been achieved -- the North Korean armies were in full and broken retreat from 
South Korea. "221 MacArthur criticized those people as believing "more could be 
accomplished by appeasement than by moral resolution"222 and "They seemed to 
believe that the leaders of Communism would temporize, too. "223 MacArthur took the 
stand that if the United Nations let North Korea stay behind sanctuary of the 38th 
parallel, they would prepare another army for the next invasion.224 
There was a big difference between the first U.N. resolution on Korea and the 
second one. The first resolution only required the restoration of status quo in Korea 
while the second resolution was an extension of the first one, which called for its 
members to take "all appropriate steps" to achieve a unified Korea. Although U.S. 
troops crossed the parallel on October 7, the order to advance into North Korea was 
already issued on September 29 and South Korean troops crossed the parallel on 
October 1. It was six days before the U.N. Security Council passed the second 
resolution. This difference in time shows, as confessed by Dean Acheson in his 
memoirs, that "although introduced by eight other nations, this was another American 
resolution. "225 This made the Chinese leaders strongly believe that the United Nations 
was under the control of the United States. 
Truman and Acheson had tried to convince the CCP that "the action in Korea was 
in no sense directed against China" and that "its aims in Korea was purely and simply 
to repel aggression and help the Koreans to be free, independent and united. "226 
Simultaneously, it was made plain that "the United States would consider it an act of 
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aggression for anyone to join with the North Korean Communists. "227 The CCP 
simply regarded the messages from the United States promising not to invade China as 
a sort of stratagem to gain a respite. Their argument was that they had been fooled by 
the White House once already(in the example of Formosa) and they could not afford 
to let it happen again. That is, before the outbreak of the Korean War, both Truman 
and Acheson openly declared that would not interfere with Chinese affairs and would 
let Formosa fall into the hands of Chinese Communists. When war broke out in 
Korea, the White House immediately sent its Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait, 
which the Chinese Communists regarded as a breach of the "promise" made earlier by 
the White House not to defend Formosa. They decided to go on with their 
preparations for an intervention and watched closely the movements of MacArthur's 
troops228 . 
As one of the top strategists, MacArthur had predicted the possibility of a 
Chinese intervention when Truman sent the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait. He 
warned that the move had "released the two great Red Chinese armies assigned to the 
coastal defence of central China and made them available for transfer elsewhere. "229 
These Chinese troops were later reported moving northward into Manchuria. As early 
as July, 1950, MacArthur had informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the enemy forces 
included Chinese Communists: "This force more and more assumes the aspect of a 
combination of Soviet leadership with Communist ground elements. "230 Now it is 
clear that the forces referred to by MacArthur were Korean soldiers who had served in 
the PLA and were sent back to Korea with their equipment and weapons before the 
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war erupted. However, this shows MacArthur paid close attention to intelligence 
reports concerning Chinese Army's movements and had knowledge of direct Chinese 
participation in the conflict. 
MacArthur acknowledged that he actually "knew nothing of the purpose"231 of the 
coming meeting with the President on Oct 15, 1950. His knowledge about the 
President was that the latter knew little of the Oriental nations but had "a strong 
combination of distorted history and vague hopes that somehow, some way, we could 
do something to help those struggling against Communism. "232 
Dean Acheson privately regarded this meeting as "futile and demeaning to the 
office of the President"233 because "it was the only occasion in which he felt Truman 
failed to maintain the authority and prestige of his office. "234 Dean Acheson did not 
go to Wake Island with the President because he "wanted no part of it, and saw no 
good coming from it". 235 
The President explained his motives as "I went because I want to see and talk to 
General MacArthur. The best way to see him and talk to him is to meet him. "236 But 
General Willoughby thought the President aimed to share MacArthur's military 
achievements at Inchon and make use of it in the coming presidential election. 237 
At Wake Island, Truman talked with MacArthur on various topics -- the ending 
of war in Korea; the Japanese peace treaty; the post-war reconstruction of Korea and 
the prospects for Russian and Chinese intervention as well as the possibility of a war 
with China. Although the issue of Russian or Chinese entry into the war "was brought 
up almost casually"238 by the President, it was obviously one of his major concerns. 
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As early as October 5, the President had got intelligence reports that "18 Red divisions 
[were] along the Yalu, while an over-all total of 38 divisions was carried in 
Manchuria."239 At that time in areas near the Yalu River there were only 4 American 
divisions plus 4 South Korean divisions. 240 Still, MacArthur told Truman that the 
chance for a Chinese intervention was "very little" by pointing out that the Chinese 
had no air cover and they could at most move 50-60,000 men across the Yalu River 
and he assured the President that the war was going to be over by Thanksgiving and 
that there would be the "greatest slaughter" if the Chinese dared to challenge his 
troops. 241 The President seemed to be satisfied with the General's explanation and they 
switched on to other topics. The fact is it was almost impossible to prove how many 
men the Chinese could actually get across the Yalu River since Truman ordered that 
American planes stay 20 miles away from the Yalu River, which forbade "hot pursuit" 
into the Chinese side of the river. 242 
The real opinion of the general lies in his own words: "Had they interfered in the 
first or second months it would have been decisive" and that the U.N. forces were "no 
longer fearful of their intervention. "243 The general thought that his army could defeat 
any challenge from the Chinese: "my own military estimate was that with our largely 
unopposed air forces, with their potential capable of destroying, at will, bases of attack 
and lines of supply north as well as south of the Yalu, no Chinese military commander 
would hazard the commitment of large forces upon the devastated Korean peninsula. 
The risk of their utter destruction through lack of supply would be too great. "244 
Strategically, there was nothing wrong with MacArthur's theory. But both 
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Truman and MacArthur neglected one thing -- the Chinese Communists, like other 
communists in the world, always gave first priority to politics in conducting a war. 
Secondly, the Chinese Communists did not quite understand the working procedure of 
the American political system. They did not understand the checks and balances of 
western democracy, naively believing that the President and the General were working 
for the same goal. As a result, when the President proclaimed, after the long trip, that 
"I have just returned from Wake Island where I had a very satisfactory conference 
with General Douglas MacArthur,"245 the CCP regarded this as an open denial to their 
earlier warnings that the United States was determined to enlarge the war into North 
Korea and perhaps into Manchuria as well. 246 
The CCP was more convinced that Manchuria was the U.N. forces' next target 
when MacArthur returned to Tokyo on October 17 and ordered the 8th Army and 10th 
Army to advance directly to the Yalu River instead of the original plan to use the 
South Korean troops as the spear. 247 Since the U.N. troops were pushing towards the 
Yalu river very rapidly and Pyongyang was going to fall in a day or two, Mao and 
Peng made the decision that the CPV had better get ready to cross the Yalu River on 
October 17.248 On the same day, Mao cabled to the CPV headquarters in Shenyang, 
asking them to cross the River on october 19.249 Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang flew to 
Beijing at once. On October 18, the official order was given to the CPV to enter 
Korea: " ... decision has been made that the CPV four armies and three artillery 
divisions will enter North Korea for combat according to the original plan .... the 
crossing will start early every evening and end every early morning in order to keep it 
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a secret.... The first night(l 9th) at least two or three divisions must be transferred into 
Korea. The second night same or more divisions will be sent into Korea. "250 
Top Chinese leaders met again on October 18 in Beijing to discuss details. Zhou 
presented a report about military assistance from the Soviet Union. He said Stalin 
would send equipment and ammunition the CPV needed and the Soviet air force 
would not enter the war for sure but would defend Chinese territory. 251 It was likely 
that Zhou Enlai had exchanged with Stalin about the priority concern of the CCP for 
their security. 
On October 19, 1950, the CPV crossed the Yalu River. On October 20, Peng 
Dehuai met Kim II Sung and Pak Hon Yong. Peng discussed with Kim three likely 
prospects of the Chinese involvement: "(1) We will be able to hold our ground by 
eliminating the enemy, thus leading to a reasonable solution of the Korean problem. 
(2) We will be able to hold our ground, but cannot eliminate the enemy, and the war 
will enter a stalemate. (3) We fail to hold our ground, and are driven back [to China]. 
we will surely try our best to achieve the first." 252 Peng then told Kim II Sung that the 
first group of the CPV that had crossed the Yalu was 260,000 in total. The CPV had 
a reserve force of 80,000 men in Manchuria which would be transferred into Korea 
soon. In order to prevent any unfavorable situation from happening, the CCP Military 
Committee also mobilized another 20 divisions as the second and third echelons. The 
total number of men of the CPV would reach 600,000. Peng also told Kim that the 
key point in the Chinese involvement was to achieve an impartial and reasonable 
solution. In the meanwhile, China should be prepared for the United States to declare 
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war on her or bombard Manchuria and China's industrial bases. 253 In the first stage of 
the Chinese intervention, their goal was to drive the U.S. troops into the sea and reach 
a "reasonable solution".254 By "a reasonable solution" the CCP meant the withdrawal 
of the U.N. forces back to the 38th parallel and the restoration of North Korea 
Territory. 
On the same day of the Chinese entry into Korea, Pyongyang was captured by the 
U.N. troops. At some points U.N. troops(South Koreans) advanced as far as within 
30-40 miles of the Chinese-Korean border. Facing this new situation, the CPV 
headquarters decided to change their original defensive combat plan since the rapid 
advance of the U.N. forces made it impossible for the CPV to establish a defensive 
perimeter. Peng cabled to Beijing, suggesting they wipe out the enemy troops in the 
form of a mobile war. This plan was immediately approved by Mao Zedong. 255 Mao 
instructed Peng in a cable: "The problem now is how to complete, in tactical sense, 
preparations for the campaign within a few days so that we can start the combat in a 
few days; you should not try to deploy the defense for a period and then start the 
offensive. "256 
This readjustment of strategy on the Chinese side proved to be a great success. 
On October 25, the I 18th Division under the 40th Army of the CPV initiated the first 
surprise attack upon South Korean troops in the Unsan area. In twelve days, South 
Korean troops were forced to retreat from the Yalu to the Chongchun River. The 
Chinese statistics showed that about 15,000 south Korean soldiers were killed or 
captured in this campaign. 257 
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Nevertheless, this setback did not serve as a serious warning to General 
Macarthur that the Chinese were intervening in a large scale. The general, like other 
U.S. leaders, underestimated the capability and determination of the Chinese. In early 
November, he scheduled the start of a new "end the war" offensive campaign. 
Actually, MacArthur did get reliable information about the Chinese army's movements 
in North Korea. 258 
This suggests, as has been discussed earlier, that MacArthur welcomed the 
Chinese encounter. He aimed to fight a general war in Asia so as to check the 
Communist expansion and to prove his theory that Asia was the major theater to deter 
Communism. 
On October 23, Mao again sent a cable to Peng Dehuai, instructing Peng to take 
advantage of the U.N. forces' ignorance of the CPV presence in the north so as to 
wipe out two or more South Korean divisions first. Even at this time, Mao still hoped 
what the CCP was doing could bring the United States to negotiations for a peaceful 
solution. Mao's argument was if the CPV could wipe out a few "puppet"(referring to 
South Korean troops) divisions and win the first victory, the situation would tum to 
the favor of China and North Korea, which would possibly force the United States to 
seek diplomatic means for negotiations with China.259 
The CPV headquarters followed the traditional communist war strategy --
purposely showing Chinese weakness, increasing the arrogance of the enemy and 
letting them run wild and luring them deep into our areas. 260 In light of this strategy, 
Peng Dehuai ordered all his troops to retreat for about 30 kilometers so as to occupy 
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favorable positions, and to wait for the best opportunity to attack the enemy. 261 
On November 9, Mao cabled Peng, approving the CPV' plan of preparations of 
the second campaign. In the cable, Mao suggested: " We are trying to fight one or 
two battles from now to early December in order to eliminate seven or eight enemy 
regiments on both the eastern and western fronts and push the front line up to the 
railway areas between Pyongyang and Wonsan. If we can manage to do so, the basic 
victory of the war is ours. "262 Mao made this plan as he realized that it was hard to 
drive the United States into the sea as the CCP had hoped because of the limits of 
China's military strength and the special geography of the long Korean peninsula 
which is open to assaults from the sea like the Inchon Landing. 
On November 25, the CPV troops started their counter-offensive on both the 
eastern and western fronts. It forced the U.N. forces to begin "the most infamous 
retreat in American military history".263 On December 5, the CPV troops recaptured 
Pyongyang. By the end of 1950, the CPV troops had regained nearly all the lost 
territory for North Korea. 
This setback finally made MacArthur realize that he was facing "an entirely new 
war". However, he did not show any intention to abandon his aggressive strategy. 
Instead, he suggested more aggressive actions in North Korea and even in Manchuria. 
His aggressiveness eventually led to a split between him and the President and was the 
major reason in his dismissal by the President.264 
From December 31 1950 to May 21, 1951, the CPV launched the Third, Fourth 
and Fifth campaigns which pushed back the U.N. forces south of the 38th parallel and, 
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stabilized the CPV's front line at the 3 8th parallel. 265 From this time on the war 
became small-scale battles and both the Chinese side and the United Nations side 
began to show the intention for a solution through negotiations. 
On June 23, 1951, Jacob Malik, the Soviet Representative at the United Nations, 
with the approval of both Chinese and North Koreans, formally called for a ceasefire. 
The CCP immediately endorsed Malik's initiative. 266 On July 10, 1951, Chinese and 
North Korea representatives and the U.N. delegates met for the first time at Kaesong --
negotiations to end the conflict started and took two years for the two sides to reach 
an acceptable agreement. On July 27, 1953, the armistice was signed by both sides 
and it went into effect 12 hours later, thus ending the largest bloody conflict between 
the two camps since the Second World War and the start of the Cold War.267 
In the research of the Korean War, many scholars, both Chinese and American, 
agree that it was the concern of national security of the CCP that brought China into 
the conflict. This is of course the bottom line of the CCP's decision to enter the war. 
In addition, the Sino-Soviet Alliance committed China to some responsibility based on 
Communist internationalism to send help to North Korea when necessary. 
The Korean War was an occasion to test the strength and viability of the Sino-
Soviet Alliance. In this conflict, Stalin was totally convinced of the Chinese 
Communists' strength and determination. On the other hand, the Chinese Communists 
were shocked to see Stalin's "betrayal" in the refusal of the Soviet to provide air cover 
which resulted in much greater Chinese casualties and naturally left a deep crack in 
the relations between the two Communist nations. 
93 
Before this intervention the CCP tried every means to warn the United States(the 
leading state in the United Nations forces in Korea) so as to avoid a direct military 
conflict with the United States since they knew well their economic potential did not 
allow them to risk a general war. To the CCP's disappointment, the White House 
policy makers were obviously influenced and attempted and gambled on a very likely 
unified pro-American Korea. 
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CONCLUSION 
From the above analysis, it is quite clear the reason why the CCP chose to 
make this decision was primarily security concerns. To be more specific, what the 
CCP really feared was the coming-back of Chiang Kai-shek and the loss of their 
regime as shown in the CCP's communications with the Soviet Union and their 
warnings to the United States. Fearing a potential menace from the United States and 
believing that a military conflict between the United States and China was inevitable, 
the Chinese Communist leaders thought it might be better for them to choose time and 
place for the war. The CCP had reasons to take the risk. When American troops, 
following South Korean troops, finally crossed the 38th parallel (which had been 
regarded by the CCP as the final limit) and advanced in the direction of the Yalu 
River, the Chinese troops went across the Yalu River and joined the fighting. Thus 
the Korean War became a conflict principally between America and China. Although 
there were some changes in the Chinese Communists' aims in joining this war, the 
eventual aim of China was to deter the enemy from further adventures and to achieve 
a 'just" peace in Korea by which they meant the status quo antebellum. The CCP 
have been regarding this war as a total victory over the U.S. Imperialist "Paper Tiger" 
because they successfully pushed the U.N. forces back behind the 38th parallel, saved 
their communist neighbor from being crashed and secured their Manchurian border. In 
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retrospect, the conflict between China and the United States could have been avoided 
if the CCP and the White House policy makers had communicated with each other 
better and understood each other's intentions better. 
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